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ABSTRACT

The resounding defeat of President Carter's managerial approach to foreign policy had more to do with the dynamics of domestic politics than with the international events often credited for the decisive shift that followed. Managerialism is an approach for maintaining U.S. global influence which calls for a reinvigorated system of world trade and the creation of rationalized institutions of financial cooperation in partnership with the expansion of multinational corporate investment. In response to the well-organized and well-financed "Soviet threat" campaign led by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), domestic support for foreign policy became a greater factor than its perception abroad, not to mention the intrinsic merits of the policy itself. As a result, the debate about the proper course for the post-Vietnam era took place within increasingly narrow limits defined by the right. The accelerating momentum of the new mood, well underway before Carter lost Iran and Nicaragua, led finally to the Democrats' 1980 defeat despite the born-again militarism that characterized the administration's approach in its latter years. Any reluctance on the part of Carter and his Trilateral Commission managerialists was replaced by the enthusiasm of Reagan and his coterie of CPD warriors. Having oscillated from militarism to managerialism and back again, American politics is at an historic crossroads. One way points toward the continuing pursuit of empire; the other path favors a foreign policy cognizant that global social justice and national security have become indivisible in an age of transformation and interdependence. (RM)

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EMPIRE AT BAY: CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES AND AMERICAN POLITICS AT THE CROSSROADS

SP 014 639

Jerry W. Sanders

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

The Establishment: A House Divided 2

Intra-Elite Conflict and Mass Politics 8

The Managerial Collapse 15

From Global Interdependence to Global Confrontation 18

Elite Discord and Mass Protest 31

At the Crossroads 39

EMPIRE AT BAY: CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES AND AMERICAN POLITICS AT THE CROSSROADS

Jerry W. SANDERS*

Introduction

When the American Ambassador to South Vietnam was lifted from the embassy rooftop in Saigon one war ended and another began. The debate at home over the lessons of Vietnam split the American foreign policy establishment into warring factions each with its own ideas for the era that would follow. On one side stood those resembling Machiavelli's *foxes*, convinced that military intervention was no longer cost-effective in an age of revolutionary ferment and nationalist uprising. Their approach for maintaining U.S. global influence called for a reinvigorated system of world trade and the creation of rationalized institutions of financial cooperation in partnership with the expansion of multinational corporate investment. I refer to this policy current as *managerialism*, its ideas best represented in the early Carter years.

Managerialism was challenged by the more familiar ideology of *militarism* which, in the tradition of Machiavelli's *lion*, embraces force as the *sine qua non* of state power. Militarists accused managerialists of suffering from "Vietnam syndrome," an affliction responsible for a continuing "failure of nerve" in U.S. leadership. Accordingly, this faction called for the "rearming of America," projecting a vast military buildup of both nuclear and conventional forces in hope of regaining the military superiority and credible interventionist threat enjoyed in the halcyon days of the cold war before defeat in Vietnam.

Reagan's election in 1980 was not so much a prelude to the triumph of militarism in the intra-elite conflict, as its confirmation. Midway through Carter's term, the managerialism he embraced early on had been thwarted and by its end, such spokesmen as Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young were no longer in

*Special thanks to Sherle R. Schwenninger for coaxing a better essay out of this effort as well as for his unflagging encouragement throughout.

the Administration. In this paper we will see how the resounding defeat of the managerial approach had more to do with the dynamics of domestic politics than with the international events often credited for the decisive shift that followed. In response to the well-organized and well-financed "Soviet threat" campaign led by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), domestic support for foreign policy became a greater factor than its perception abroad, not to mention the intrinsic merits of the policy itself. As a result, the debate about the proper course for the post-Vietnam era took place within increasingly narrow limits defined by the right. The accelerating momentum of the new mood, well underway before Carter "lost" Iran and Nicaragua, led finally to the Democrats' 1980 defeat despite the born-again militarism that characterized the Administration's approach in its latter years. Any reluctance on the part of Carter and his Trilateral Commission managerialists was replaced by the enthusiasm of Reagan and his coterie of CPD warriors.

In effect, the intra-elite struggle prompted by the failure of military intervention in Vietnam ended in victory for the side that refused to consider any other alternative for the post-Vietnam period. This created an irony of its own. So long as they were out of power, militarist hardliners could attack managerial moderates, arguing that centrifugal forces pulling away from the world-order system could be averted by adopting new leadership and old strategies. Now, midway through his term of office, however, despite the striking contrast in strategy and style, Reagan has fared little better than his predecessor in breathing life into a moribund Pax Americana.

Having oscillated from militarism to managerialism and back again, American politics is at an historic crossroads. One way points toward the continuing pursuit of empire, a burden destined to bear an increasingly heavy price even as its returns diminish in the years ahead. The other path turns away from containment altogether, transcending the Machiavellian realism of both *lions* and *foxes* in favor of a foreign policy cognizant of the fact that global social justice and national security have become indivisible in an age of transformation and interdependence. While one cannot be sanguine that the latter course will be chosen, the pursuit of militarized security is creating a growing "security gap" of its own at home which has put demilitarized economic and social security at the center of the political agenda. Unlike the heyday of the cold war, the U.S. can no longer have it both ways. Which will prevail depends, in William Appleman Williams' words, on whether the American people can break free from "empire as a way of life."[1]

The Establishment: A House Divided

From its inception, the Pax Americana that emerged from the destruction of

World War II embodied the commingled objectives of stabilizing an international economic climate favorable to capitalist expansion, and maintaining political hegemony in areas defined as vital to U.S. geopolitical interests. With these twin goals in mind, there rose to prominence a national security elite whose background and experience in both the corporate and diplomatic establishments prepared them well for the ecumenical outlook needed to bridge the worlds of finance and power, and to defuse potential conflicts between the two.[2]

The essence of this national security elite's approach to empire was codified in NSC-68, a secret policy review carried out in 1950 under the direction of Paul Nitze, a founder along with Eugene Rostow of the present-day Committee on the Present Danger. NSC-68 called for a strategy I call Containment Militarism.[3] Emerging triumphant after a struggle known in the annals of cold war history as the Great Debate of 1950–51, a campaign which featured the original Committee on the Present Danger, NSC-68's interventionist logic remained virtually unchallenged until Vietnam.[4]

Whereas Containment Militarism had celebrated military and economic expansionism as the twin pillars of empire, for many Vietnam marked the end of such harmony. In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in January–February 1968, the precepts of NSC-68 came under growing fire, not just from radical critics of the war, but increasingly from within the heart of the establishment itself.

"The central problem of world order for the coming years," postulated a position paper of the Trilateral Commission, "is the management of interdependence," not "the containment of communism" which had been the dominant refrain justifying the maintenance of empire for a quarter century. While the Trilateral Commission was certainly the most influential champion of managerialism, a similar sense of epochal transformation demanding a new approach to hegemony guided the seminars and position papers of the 1980's Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Endowment, the Brookings Institution, the Aspen Institute, and almost everywhere else that the foreign policy establishment met to formulate a strategy for the post-Vietnam era. The liturgical code phrase "global interdependence" graced the pages of a new and influential journal *Foreign Policy*, itself the product of intra-elite debate over the "lessons of Vietnam."[5]

Three major steps toward the establishment of a new strategy were outlined in a key Trilateral document entitled *Towards a Renovated International System*: Managing the world economy, satisfying basic human needs, and keeping the peace.[6] The first was concerned primarily with the deteriorated relationship with Europe and Japan, the second addressed North-South inequalities, and the last the policy of detente with the Soviet Union.

Turning first to the international economic order, the American-Japanese-European composition of the Commission's membership was itself a beginning. From the viewpoint of the Trilateralists, a refurbished world order depended first and foremost on a cooperative and consultative partnership among the core capitalist nations. Acknowledging the realities of transnational investment that had already integrated the economies of the three regions and left them vulnerable to one another's vicissitudes, the Trilateral position maintained that unilateral actions were inherently destabilizing and no longer tolerable.[7] They thus urged greater Trilateral coordination, especially in presenting a united front in dealing with the raw material and energy-producing nations of the Third World.

At the same time, it was argued, the Trilateral relationship should not be a cartel arrangement, which would only serve to exacerbate North-South tensions in the manner of the 1973 oil embargo. Instead, the approach called for a stable Trilateral center that would invite selected Third World countries to join in a rationalized world economy that offered them greater promise of gain through dependency than they could hope to achieve through independence. This, of course, would require a more equitable deal for the Third World than had been the case in the past, including higher prices for raw materials and lowered tariff barriers on manufactured exports to industrial nations. The short-run sacrifice of profits, however, would pay dividends to the industrial nations in the long run as a result of the stability gained from such reforms. In the new world order there would be no losers.

Finally, in terms of keeping the peace, the Commission's strategy for minimizing East-West tensions followed the prescription of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. A confirmed multilateralist, Hull implored, "If goods can't cross borders, armies will." The United States needed markets, energy, and raw materials which the USSR could supply. The Soviets needed technology and wheat which the U.S. could provide. The basis was there for a binding commercial relationship in the national interest of both parties. As the Soviet Union became increasingly dependent on Western economic cooperation, so the argument went, they would—like the Third World—develop a stake in the smooth functioning of the international (capitalist) order.

In sum, the key to harmony in the world system (and not incidentally, to the restoration of US power and prestige), from the managerial perspective, was maximization of trade within a tripartite and interdependent global structure: the Trilateral core linking the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; the North-South nexus between the industrial nations and the Third World; and the East-West axis between the US and the Soviet Union, as well as with China. Maximization of trade, correspondingly, would discourage economic protec-

tionism among the Trilateral countries, would narrow the gap between the developed and underdeveloped nations thus allowing for access to energy resources and raw materials, and would reduce tensions between the superpowers.

The East-West balance held the future of both North-South and Trilateral relations. Without detente and a second SALT agreement, an expensive new phase of the arms race would likely slow real economic growth to the point where not enough surplus would be generated to accommodate Third World demands for more equitable trade arrangements—the quid pro quo guaranteeing access to resources. Moreover, an increase in military spending could be expected to trigger a new round of inflation at home, exacerbating the balance-of-payments deficit and once again creating barriers of economic nationalism between the US and its Trilateral partners. A major obstacle standing in the way of this managerial (and magisterial) framework was the worldview of NSC-68, an observation not lost on the advocates of interdependence—nor on the upholders of Containment Militarism.

If global interdependence was the new reality of the post-Vietnam period so the CPD and its cold war confederates reasoned, tendencies toward Third World nationalism, Eurocommunism, and other expressions of non-alignment remained as dangerous and intolerable as ever. Establishment cold warriors like CPD co-founders Nitze and Rostow remained unshaken in their belief that a world order favorable to America's national interests rested upon forceful global leadership and a credible interventionist posture such as existed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. In their view, the US should spare no amount of effort and resources to regain military superiority—or at least the appearance thereof. Trade, on the other hand, should be used not so much as an inducement toward future cooperation, but instead as a reward for past behavior.[8] Thus detente, and especially SALT, held a place of central importance in the plans of managerialists and militarists alike, but, in the case of the latter, it was seen as standing in the way of their ambitions.

The CPD recognized early on that an agreement to limit arms was anathema to their projections of a major military buildup. While they argued their case on the basis of Soviet machinations and intransigence, closer examination reveals that the CPD-led opposition to SALT sprang from a source deeper than distrust of the Soviets. The central tenet and prelude to negotiation, namely the institutionalization of strategic equivalence, attacked the basic premise of Containment Militarism and thus stood in the way of the hard-liners' vision of a return to cold war expansionism. The world view of Paul Nitze, et. al., holds that global competition remains a zero-sum game in which the power of a nation-state either advances or retreats. Equilibrium between adversaries is a mere illusion harbored by those beset by what CPD's Norman Podhoretz calls a "failure of nerve."

Nitze and company also stand fast on the belief that military force and the threat of its use remains the primary determinant of international politics. In fact, it is the central lesson to be learned from Vietnam, according to Rostow:

> This is the true moral of Vietnam, above and beyond a good many others about the failure to press for military victory. The deterioration of our nuclear advantage led to the erosion of our position, and profoundly affected the final stages of the conflict.[9]

The road back to the lost Eden of military superiority in the post-Vietnam era carried with it prospects of a quantum leap in military technology and spending, not unlike the arms race set off in the wake of NSC-68 which increased the defense budget threefold by the end of 1950. SALT stood in the way of such a buildup on a number of counts. The ambitious counterforce program by which the hardliners hoped to regain the strategic edge might at some point be threatened by its terms even though they would allow the U.S. in the immediate period to proceed with all its planned deployments (MX, Pershing II, Trident D-5, the B1 bomber and a substantial cruise missile program). More importantly, perhaps, the sanguine domestic climate that would follow a SALT II ratification would hardly be supportive of the vast sums such a course required. Finally, the signing of a treaty would reverberate throughout the international order, loosening the U.S. hold on nations ensnared in an alliance network legitimized by superpower confrontation. Thus, behind the public charge that a Soviet threat made strategic arms limitations impossible lurked the greater fear that successful arms control was in fact undesirable. As UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick, then a member of the CPD's executive board, explained: "I am willing to be just as generous as we possibly can be (on SALT) as long as that's consistent with maintaining clear supremacy."[10] By the time the final curtain on Vietnam had fallen, the two warring schools—one economic/managerial in approach and the other military/geopolitical in outlook—were on a course destined for collision.

The 1976 election provided the forum for their decisive polarization. Uppermost on the election's foreign policy agenda was the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente which served as a lightning rod for mounting bitterness among political elites. Conservatives who acquiesced in detente because it made possible the reescalation of the Vietnam war, nevertheless, held a visceral contempt for negotiation with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Liberals, who applauded the easing of superpower tensions, were equally appalled at the cynical manipulation of detente for purposes of further destruction in Southeast Asia. Thus, in the first election of the post-Vietnam era, conservatives joined disgruntled establishment hawks, burying their past differences to speak with one voice against detente on the grounds that the cold war had not slackened but intensified. Managerialists and liberals, on the other hand,

attempted to rescue detente from the Metternichian calculations of Kissinger and shape it into more stable structures of institutional cooperation.

Judging from the composition of the Carter Administration, one would have thought the power struggle had been resolved. Carter's foreign policy and national security appointees were drawn almost exclusively from the managerial side of the spectrum. The CPD had submitted 53 names to Carter and failed to receive even one appointment, despite the group's heavily Democratic makeup. When asked his opinion of the new Trilateral-laden Administration, Rostow cryptically replied, "My views are unprintable." Nitze added with dismay, "Every softliner I can think of is in government."[11] Nevertheless, despite the fact that the establishment's cold warriors had been locked out of government, Carter's policies came increasingly to resemble the wishes of those whom he had snubbed in the appointment process.

Since the legitimacy of Containment Militarism had been seriously undermined with the Vietnam war, the question looms as to why Carter with his Trilateral team did not simply sweep the doctrine into the dustbin of history and get on with the business of building an international and domestic climate consonant with the managerial vision of empire. One possible answer to this conundrum is the obvious one that Carter and his mentors never had any intentions of charting a new course in foreign policy to begin with, a logic consistent with the standard radical thesis of a monolithic elite. But, as the previous section has indicated, there is simply too much evidence to ignore the profound rift at the top. Dating from the disillusionment of Tet forward to and inclusive of the Carter years, the struggle between managerialism and militarism made US foreign policy an ideological battleground.

A second explanation of the Carter Administration's evolution from the promise of interdependence to a posture of confrontation is that, while the differences between the Administration and its hardline critics were real enough, the managerialists soon abandoned plans for a "new world order" as a result of Soviet-inspired aggression accompanied by a massive military buildup. As I have tried to show elsewhere, this worst-case perception of Soviet capabilities and intentions, which has now become official dogma, represents a deliberate distortion of reality for purposes of partisan gain.[12] Even though the Soviets have made significant military improvements over the last decade to reach a point of strategic parity with the U.S., the alleged "window of vulnerability" (the current version of the "Soviet threat") has no basis in fact and appears to be as calculated as previous apocryphal threats, gaps, and exaggerations of Soviet capabilities and intentions that have been well documented over the course of the Cold War.[13]

A third possible interpretation, and the one advanced here, is that the momentum of domestic politics was the decisive factor in the Carter Administra-

tion's abandonment of detente for an all-out return to a cold war posture. This departure from conventional wisdom requires a word of explanation. Most people, apologists and critics alike, subscribe to consensual images of the American political system (disagreeing on whether it is achieved, according to the former, by acclamation, or, according to the latter, by manipulation) in which the byzantine intrigue of conflicting and circulating elites seldom figures into the national vocabulary. Moreover, casual observation and rigorous scholarship alike have made commonplace the notion that the policy formulation process is restricted to an elite coterie whose deliberations are protected for better or worse (again depending on perspective) from the opinions of the mass public. And, it is widely recognized that elites prefer it that way and would rather argue their case within the executive than before more popular deliberating bodies.

But all this applies to ordinary times of consensus. The CPD's departure from the usual elite modus operandi was, if anything, indicative of just how extraordinary the internecine policy war had become. Unable to prevail through collegial persuasion, the Committee turned to coercive pressure through the untoward tactic of public mobilization. Unwilling to confront the "present danger" at home, but even less the prospects of a one-term presidency, Carter attempted to placate his critics with the result that policy debate moved steadily to the right.

Intra-Elite Conflict And Mass Politics

Having lost out in the placement of personnel, the CPD did not surrender hope of exercising control over policy. On the contrary, three days after the 1976 election the Committee's luminaries formally introduced their campaign to the media and public. As noted above, this was a highly irregular strategy for men possessed of such inside experience. But the extraordinary situation demanded as much. Accommodation behind closed doors, the establishment's *leitmotif*, had long since broken down. This, coupled with their exclusion from the insiders' circle, left them little choice but the path of public mobilization. While highly unusual, such a strategy was not unprecedented. On the contrary, when foreign policy is in a state of transition, mass politics takes on an importance far greater than in periods of settled policy and elite consensus. An ancient Confucian dictum states that in times of struggle "the mandate of heaven is reflected in the eyes and ears of the people." In our secularized version, elites are always aware that "the mandate of the next election" can be gleaned from the public opinion polls. This being the case, in periods of conflict, the faction of the elite that can command popular support for its cause—

or that can marshall enough evidence to make a claim for its existence—will be in a prime position to dictate the terms of a new foreign policy strategy. Hence the politicization of policy in the post-Vietnam era.

The danger that gave rise to the CPD emanated not from Moscow, but Washington. A reading of Committee literature, in fact, reveals a barely disguised, if grudging, admiration for the Soviet leadership's unswerving dedication to global competition—this in marked contrast to our own establishment's alleged "failure of nerve." The most disturbing factor in "the correlation of forces" (the perception of power between East and West measured by a calculus that includes economic, political, military, and psychological factors in its formula), to invoke a favorite term of Nitze's, was not any sudden shift in Soviet policy but the "loss of will" at home, perfectly reflected in the managerial imagery of "global interdependence." Thus the crisis that presented itself with Carter's election was the possibility that managerialism would become the guidepost of U.S. foreign policy, as had Containment Militarism a generation earlier.

The strategy of the CPD in the beginning was to have the President's head only as a final resort. As men of the executive who understood the symbolic power of the presidency in foreign policy matters, they preferred to change his mind. The CPD's early failure to cajole the President into accepting their preferred strategy however, coupled with the steady shift of the national mood in their favor, led them to believe that outside coercion could succeed where inside persuasion had fallen short. The key to mobilizing the tide of opinion was the proven cold war strategy of resurrecting the Soviet Threat.

The opening salvo had begun even before Carter entered office, when key members of the CPD authored the controversial Team B intelligence report criticizing the CIA for being soft in its estimations of Soviet capabilities and intentions. [14] The importance of these national intelligence estimates (NIEs) derives from the fact that they provide the guidance for the size and shape of the defense budget, the type of strategic posture the military should assume, as well as the Administration's overall approach to East-West relations including, of course, arms control and trade. Thus, if the hardline view were to prevail in the NIE and a new Soviet Threat accepted within national security circles, a president would be hard put to declare an end to cold war confrontation. This was the dilemma the CPD presented to Carter with their successful assault on the CIA.

The Committee stepped up pressure in the confirmation hearings of cabinet appointees, making managerialist Paul Warnke's nomination as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and as head of the SALT delegation, an occasion for promoting their alarmist views. Unable to block Warnke, the CPD and its supporters nevertheless claimed victory, since

the vote in his favor was less than that needed to ratify any SALT agreement he might negotiate. Moreover, in the Warnke campaign, the CPD forged important links with the New Right, a relationship which would be once again set in motion in the drive to defeat SALT.[15]

The CPD next turned its attention to the Administration's SALT proposals, roundly condemning the Soviets for rejecting the Carter team's initial unorthodox effort,[16] and then heaping equal scorn on the Administration's second, more conciliatory, offer. The charges of America's strategic vulnerability, in conjunction with judicious leaks of the classified Team B report and "dirty tricks" tactics to discredit Warnke (a scurrilous "anonymous memo" was circulated attacking his credibility), gained wide press coverage for the views of the burgeoning alliance of cold warriors. Taken all together, these early efforts achieved remarkable success in restoring the "Soviet threat" to the national agenda despite the relative lull in international tensions that graced Carter's first months in office. (In succeeding years, the environment would be more bountiful, yielding many more occasions which the CPD could exploit as "extraordinary crises" that demanded emergency buildup and a show of force).

The CPD's fulminations soon got them on Carter's agenda as well, a turn of events savored by the Committee after the earlier snub of their services. In response to six months of harassment, Carter invited the Committee's leadership to an unannounced meeting at the White House with himself, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, and National Security Chief Zbigniew Brzezinski. Secretary of State Vance, archsymbol of the managerial style, was conspicuous by his absence from this summit conference.

The White House session, which both sides hoped would end in a rapprochement favorable to its view, concluded, instead, on a note of bitterness that revealed the depth of the breach between managerial and militarist strategies. The point of contention upon which the meeting broke down was the matter of what the public would bear as regards military spending and intervention. When Carter told the group that public sentiment would not support the posture the CPD had in mind, the Committee charged that he had been seriously misinformed about the mood of the public because of the biases of his advisers.

The August meeting marked a tactical watershed for the CPD. Carter's stubborn refusal to abandon managerialism and assume the Trumanesque role urged upon him by the Committee, while not altogether unexpected, surprised the Committee in its intensity. At the same time, the nature of his reluctance was an invitation to quicken the effort already begun. That is, Carter had expressed the belief (rightly or wrongly) that his policy options were circumscribed by the constraints of public opinion. (The presence of opinion pollster

Patrick Caddell and public relations expert Gerald Rafshoon in the White House served to institutionalize this acute sensitivity to the public mood.) Unable, therefore, to separate Carter from managerialism, the CPD set out to prove him wrong in his perception of where the public stood, all the while reinforcing his conviction of its veto power over the policy process. In other words, the carrot of support offered to Carter, if he embarked on a program of militarization, was replaced by the stick of electoral punishment, if he did not.

Public opinion surveys, like the tea leaves and entrails consulted by elites in ancient times in hopes of mastering their fate, are subject to wide interpretation. Toward the end of the Vietnam War, for example, opinion surveys showed a markedly diminished enthusiasm for global involvement. This response, which held steady from the late 1960s to the conclusion of the war, was viewed with both alarm and fascination by the warring elite schools caught up in a running battle over managerial and militaristic strategies of containment. The end of the war produced an outpouring of concern from both these factions of the establishment against "the growing isolationist mood." In the pages of *Foreign Policy and Commentary*, neo-liberals and neo-conservatives alike worried over the "loss of confidence" in the ability of the United States to exercise active global leadership.

The reason for their alarm was obvious. Such public effrontery was an unprecedented break from the established pattern of the interwar years between Korea and Vietnam, when a largely passive public acquiesced in establishment opinion on foreign policy matters. On the other hand, it hinted at opportunity as well. Read one way, the optimistic advocate of global interdependence might conclude that the public's wariness of foreign involvement was primarily a reaction to military intervention, and, thus, that the person on the street shared the view that military power had become a costly and outmoded burden. Similarly, a proponent of Containment Militarism could reason that the popular attitude was anti-detente, anti-United Nations and anti-Third World—not anti-military at all. Both views could find some sustenance from the polls.[17]

The CPD's founding statement exuded a tone of cautious optimism in its assessment of mass sentiment: "We have faith in the maturity, good sense and fortitude of our people. But public opinion must be informed before it can reach considered judgments and make them effective in our democratic system."[18] Since Carter would not assume the mantle of leadership in this regard, the Committee appointed itself for the role. Sensing the potential for such a CPD-led mobilization, Rostow marveled: "Slowly, gradually, and almost without political leadership, American public opinion has come to realize that the Cold War is far from over."[19]

The major source of the Committee's *elan* was the public's renewed enthu-

siasm for military spending. Opinion surveys uniformly recorded an accelerating trend in favor of bigger defense budgets: in 1972, only 9% of those surveyed took the position that military spending should rise. By 1974, the figure nearly doubled to 17%, jumping again in 1976 to 28%. The percentage that wanted defense spending reduced dropped from 37% in 1972 to 33% in 1974, and finally to a low of 20% in 1976. Thus a dramatic reversal had apparently occurred in the ratio of hawks to doves—from 9–37 in 1972 to 28–20 by 1976.[20] The Gallup Poll summed up the shift in mood saying "public support for defense spending has increased to the highest point recorded over the last seven years."[21]

Nevertheless, despite the public's endorsement of increased military spending, there remained considerable doubt about what the public attitude would bear in the way of Cold War confrontation. One poll, for instance, showed that while 61% to 23% wanted to make sure that the military was superior in strength to that of any other country even if it meant increasing spending, an overwhelming majority (80% to 10%) in the same poll said they supported efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on the reduction of nuclear weapons. Tempering the CPD's interpretation of the polls, two opinion analysts sympathetic to the Committee's view nonetheless cautioned that new attitudes toward increased military spending "have not translated themselves into support for a return to the all-out military containment of the Cold War era."[22] But might they with determined guidance? The CPD's answer is apparent in Podhoretz' call to battle:

> These sentiments have not been tested in the national political arena, and until they are so tested, the question—of *whether the new isolationism is as pervasive among the masses of Americans as it is among the elites*—will have to remain moot (emphasis added).[23]

As noted earlier, the key to domestic mobilization was "the Soviet threat." To set it in motion the CPD turned to the proven cold war tactic of interpreting any and all movement and challenge to the international order as events of extraordinary crisis behind which stood the global manipulations of the Soviet Union. Such selective perception touched a responsive chord in a public frustrated by the erosion of US influence and socialized in the demonology of the cold war. As the parameters of "responsible" discourse moved steadily to the right, the Administration's managerial strategists were placed in a difficult bind. Given the increased perception of threat, the public expected a tough stance from the President. A response perceived as weak and ineffectual would send his standing plummeting in the polls, ending all hope of re-election. Unwilling to do battle on the issue of the Soviet threat itself, Carter acted accordingly, if not convincingly enough, to satisfy his critics. The defeat of SALT II serves as a case study of what happens in an intra-elite conflict when one side marshalls ideology and interests in support of its cause and the other does not.

The anti-SALT campaign was formally launched through the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, an umbrella organization modeled on the Coalition against Unilateral Disarmament which organized the anti-Warnke effort. The ubiquitous General Daniel Graham, a member of Team B, chaired both groups. Moreover, like its predecessor, the Coalition for Peace Through Strength combined the expertise of the CPD and the hydra-headed activism of the New Right. As the Congressional Quarterly described the relationship: "The Committee (CPD) could be called the brains behind the opposition (to SALT). While it does not lobby, it kindles the fire of those who do with its detailed analysis of strategic issues."[24]

A retrospect of the CPD's activities by Chairman Rostow showed the Committee to be adept in the arena of direct action as well as mobilization. At the CPD's 1979 annual meeting, Rostow detailed the following accomplishments:

> During hearings on SALT II, CPD Executive Committee and Board members testified on 17 different occasions before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees—more than all other critics of the Treaty put together; participated in 479 TV and radio programs, press conferences, debates and public forums on SALT and the military balance; and distributed over 200,000 copies of Committee pamphlets and reports, including eleven updatings of Nitze's attacks on SALT II.[25]

Figures fail to tell the complete story of the CPD's influence on the outcome of the foreign policy debate, however. Because of the prestige of its membership the Committee had a catalytic effect on other elite organizations and interest groups who committed resources of their own to the mobilization against SALT II, and detente in general. While the Coalition for Peace Through Strength was most visible, many of the Coalition's organizational affiliates carried out coordinated anti-SALT, pro-militarism campaigns of their own, using CPD policy papers to back their positions. The American Security Council, for one, estimated that it spent, in 1979 alone, $3 million to defeat SALT. The Conservative Caucus reported that it had budgeted $1 million for the SALT campaign. The American Conservative Union, which spent about $1.8 million against a Panama Canal treaty, estimated an equal amount was committed to the defeat of SALT II.[26]

Having achieved extraordinary success and considerable notoriety in its "pro-family" campaigns (anti-abortion, anti-gay, anti-ERA) through the technique of mass mailing, the New Right found the method effective at selling the Soviet threat as well. The Conservative Caucus targeted five million persons for its direct mail operation while the American Conservative Union reached another half million. Not to be outdone, the American Security Council weighed in with ten million appeals. Other efforts included a fifty-state anti-SALT petition drive and speaking tour organized by the Conservative Caucus to supplement the 150-member speakers' bureau set loose under the

aegis of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength. In addition, the Conservative Caucus launched a phone bank to urge an estimated 25,000 conservatives to telephone their senators and representatives. Finally, the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, the American Security Council, and the American Conservative Union, each produced anti-SALT films, which were shown on hundreds of TV stations around the country.

Prominently featured in all these efforts were the CPD, its members, their ideas and position papers. The alliance between the CPD and the New Right was captured well when conservative Utah Senator Jake Garn appeared on *Meet the Press* to denounce the impending agreement between Carter and Brezhnev. Referred to as "SALT point man for the New Right," Garn had shortly before announced the formation of a Defense Roundtable to advise him on military matters. Accompanying Garn for his nationally televised attack on SALT were Nitze and fellow CPD member Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations under Nixon and soon to be chair of the pro-Reagan Americans for an Effective Presidency.[27]

While the drive to defeat SALT was presented publicly as a diverse movement of independent experts and grass-roots interests with nothing more in common than their mutual alarm over the nation's defenses, the truth was something else. The visible cooperation between the CPD, military-industrial lobbyists, and the New Right was more than matched by the covert financial ties that bound them together. The Committee's tax returns, for example, show that it received $260,000 from Richard Scaife Mellon, an ultra-right multimillionaire CPD member who, according to a recent investigation, "...has made the formation of public opinion both his business and his avocation."[28] Recipients of Scaife's largesse in the foreign policy field, in addition to the CPD, include the Heritage Foundation ($3.8 million), the Hoover Institution ($3.5 million), the National Strategy Information Center ($6 million), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University ($5.3 million), to name only a few of his bigger and better-known favorites. Each was active in the media *blitzkreig* against SALT II, conducting countless studies, hosting innumerable seminars, and providing endless briefings—all warning of its perils. Finally, together with the CPD, these core Scaife-funded groups supplied the majority of advisers and appointees to policy-making posts in the Reagan Administration.

Even as Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna for the signing of the long-postponed and much-maligned SALT II Treaty in June 1979, the momentum was shifting rapidly toward a revival of the cold war—pushing the "two apes on a treadmill," to borrow a phrase from Paul Warnke, to even more dangerous and dizzying heights of arms competition.[29] Public opinion polls showed greatly increased support for military spending along with growing skepticism

of SALT and relations with the Soviet Union generally. At the same time, opinion surveys still revealed an overwhelming desire for an agreement to limit arms.[10] Rather than mobilize a constituency for SALT II, however, Carter sought to accommodate his hardline critics. Having chosen the latter course, he was thus reduced to selling the treaty by arguing that a principal virtue was that it permitted addition of the costly M-X missile system to the U.S. arsenal. This, despite the Administration's arms control impact statement which warned that adoption of the M-X constituted a new escalation of the arms race sure to worsen already deteriorating Soviet-American relations.[11] Even with Carter's support for the M-X, a truculent Senate offered few signs that it was willing to buck the anti-SALT juggernaut. Finally then, with prospects of defeat in Congress with all that would mean for his re-election bid, Carter withdrew the moribund agreement when the opportunity presented itself with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The burial of SALT accomplished, the CPD proceeded to release "The 1980 Crisis (and What We Should Do about it)," a shopworn set of recommendations embossed with an urgent tone of fresh discovery. Praising Carter for his new hardline stance, the CPD nevertheless insisted that the President's budget proposals "did not reflect the urgency of the present crisis nor the magnitude of the United States' commitment which he activated."[12] In addition to a recommended buildup of vast proportions, there was the matter of bringing personnel into the Administration who would not flinch at the prospect of confrontation. With these concerns in mind, a second summit was set at the White House between Carter and the estranged hawks of the Democratic party. Far from reassurance and reconciliation however, a snag in the reunion developed almost immediately when Carter refused to concede the error of his earlier ways and bristled at the suggestion that he conduct a swift and thorough housecleaning. Jeane Kirkpatrick conceded that the meeting "did throw cold water on whatever hopes we had that Iran and Afghanistan would have a broad effect on the President's foreign policy orientation."[13] Thus, rather than face another four years of uncertain bully tactics, the CPD's Democrats joined their Republican counterparts plunging *en masse* into the presidential campaign to install one of their own (Reagan had been inducted into the CPD by this juncture) in the White House.

The Managerial Collapse

The restoration of Containment Militarism owes as much to the surrender of the managerial strategy as it does to the brilliance of the CPD's campaign. By his failure to take managerialism to the public, Carter created a political

vacuum eagerly filled by the cold warrior elite. What might be interpreted as an error of judgment was probably nothing of the sort, however. To the contrary, there were deep and compelling reasons for the President eschewing the path of popular mobilization even as its alternative pointed toward renewed confrontation.

Carter's dilemma derived from a widening gap between international economics and domestic politics. In response to the slowdown in economic growth and the consequential capital accumulation crisis of the post-Vietnam era, managerialism sought to restructure the global division of labor. Such a strategy was designed to accelerate the long-term flow of capital into the Third World and to rationalize the penetration of US-based multinational corporations. The hoped-for result would be lowered production costs and easier access to raw materials, each enhancing business profitability and thus overcoming the pronounced stagnationist tendencies plaguing the world economy since the early 1970s.

The managerial approach to a new wave of economic expansion depended upon the Adminstration's ability to cut back government spending. Herein lay the political rub. The growth of the state in the post-1945 period had gone hand in hand with the "multinationalization" of corporate capitalism, creating in the process a proliferating array of interests in the domestic arena, many aligned with the Democratic Party. So long as the US economy remained "demand-constrained," i.e., in need of a Keynesian boost to stimulate aggregate demand, there was an essential harmony in the simultaneous expansion of the burgeoning warfare-welfare state and corporate foreign investment. Midway through the Vietnam War, however, the economy became "supply-constrained," i.e., too many demands placed on available resources.[4] Under these new circumstances, government spending and corporate investment came to increasing conflict over available capital and resources, a dilemma made worse by the slowdown in real growth as the economic crisis deepened. Thus while the Keynesian demand-induced strategy overcame the tendency toward depression in earlier periods, the claims of the warfare-welfare state had come to surpass their ability to be satisfied. As "entitlements," however, they had to be met, a circumstance which under conditions of stagnation produced accelerating inflation.

Underlying Carter's predicament was the growing incompatibility of demands generated by capitalist expansion, militarism, and democratic participation. The task before his Administration was to subordinate the latter (guns and butter) to the former (profit). If military and social spending were not brought under control, the price would be rampant inflation. Moreover, since much of the nation's entitlement program had been mandated by Congress and fell outside the range of discretionary review, military spending was the

logical target for budgetary cuts. Not that social spending would be spared. This was clearly not the case, as is apparent from a reading of the Trilateral Commission's much discussed study, *The Crisis of Democracy.* Be that as it may, the success of managerialism rested on its ability to curb rising military outlays.

Carter appeared to be moving in this direction in the early days of his Administration, professing the goal of nuclear disarmament, pledging a foreign policy of non-intervention, and promising a rollback of military spending. Nevertheless, once faced with the mounting prospects of a domestic backlash, Carter abandoned global interdependence for global confrontation. By 1980, military spending was on the rise, the nuclear arms race had been heightened with Carter's formal endorsement of a counterforce strategic doctrine (Presidential Directive 59), and military intervention was once more sanctioned with the announcement of the Carter doctrine in conjunction with plans for an interventionist rapid deployment force (RDF).

The rise of the militarist coalition sounded the death knell for managerialism as well as signalling the ignominious end of its bearer. While both elite strategies were essentially antidemocratic, managerialism could not compete in the contest of images. In the absence of a compelling alternative to the containment worldview, managerialism appeared circumspect and arcane next to the more straightforward strategy of the hardliners. If there really were a "Soviet threat," containing it by means of trade and arms agreements was bound to seem inadequate. Such a policy orientation made sense only if the Soviet Union were judged not to be an implacable foe with global ambitions, a challenge to orthodoxy that Carter showed extreme reluctance to lead.

This inconsistency of fit between the new strategy and the old world view was more than matched by disadvantages in the arena of electoral politics. After a generation of macro-economic stimulation through military spending, a broad interest constituency had arisen in support of "Keynesian militarism." Over this period, national security had become linked in the public's mind with domestic economic security, merging the classical dichotomy of guns and butter. Militarists were thus able to successfully attack the loss of jobs that would result from a cutback in military spending.

Carter could have countered these fears by adopting a program of conversion from military to civilian production. But such a program of domestic revitalization would have undermined the long-term managerial strategy which, behind its call for global reform, sought to shift older sectors of industrial production from North to South. The savings from military spending was earmarked to accelerate the flow of capital into the Third World and to hasten the migration of plants and facilities from the United States, not its opposite. As long as Carter championed managerialism then, domestic reform was

impossible. Without it, however, his Administration did not have a leg to stand on once the intra-elite struggle went public and mass perception of elite strategy became critical to the outcome.

For a time Carter attempted to walk the line between the two policy currents, adopting a tortuous dual-track foreign policy that soon saddled the Administration with charges of ineptitude, vacillation, and disingenuous motives both at home and abroad. The Iranian hostage crisis, filtered through a militarist prism by then firmly in place, only served to reinforce this pejorative characterization. Moreover, Carter's overtures toward reform appeared tepid and transparent next to Third World demands for a New International Economic Order, a formula which went well beyond what the Trilateral Commission's managers had in mind. At the same time, even these modest efforts—too little and too late in the global arena—were greeted with charges of appeasement by the CPD and the Administration's growing band of right-wing detractors. Unwilling (as well as unable without rejecting managerialism) to construct an alternative to militarism, Carter succumbed to domestic political pressures by adopting measures to make himself appear indistinguishable from the strident opposition. Predictably, his presidency was saddled with rampant inflation as he returned the nation to a cold war footing. The 1980 landslide that buried Carter served as a requiem for Trilateral managerialism as well.

From Global Interdependence to Global Confrontation

Once the election results were in, Rostow reportedly turned to his CPD colleagues and exclaimed that now, "Respectable people cannot dismiss us as cranks, crackpots, and lunatics."[3] After all, the Committee had placed forty-six of its members on Reagan's advisory task force and was about to garner over thirty high-level positions (fifty if one counts those serving in a part-time capacity) in the new Administration. The CPD now had the golden opportunity to put into practice the policies preached since its founding. The fortunes of Reagan's foreign policy in the years ahead would prove to be as closely tied to the CPD as his candidacy had been a referendum on the Committee's views.

Reagan's first news conference as President-elect served to confirm that the CPD would play a powerful role in the shape of things to come and indicated the degree to which the Committee's pet themes had already won the day. In his remarks, Reagan chose for emphasis two major areas of departure from the Carter foreign policy—arms control and human rights. On the former, he reiterated his campaign pledge to scrap SALT II. While Reagan's stance had come to represent a broad working consensus by this time, it was Nitze, in

Podhoretz' words who "as much as any single individual in this country, may be said to have created it."[16] A key adviser to Reagan during the campaign, Nitze was later appointed chief negotiator for theater nuclear forces in Europe.

On human rights, Reagan paraphrased Jeane Kirkpatrick's thesis that right-wing governments, especially those in Latin America, despite their fealty to the United States, had been treated unfairly in having military and other forms of aid curbed because of alleged human rights violations. Kirkpatrick caught Reagan's attention (via her fellow CPD colleague Richard Allen who served as Reagan's chief foreign policy adviser during the campaign) with her rendition of the differences separating totalitarian from authoritarian practices, a meanly-argued *Commentary* piece destined to become the primer for the Administration's attacks on Carter's human rights policy.[17] After a series of sessions with Reagan, Kirkpatrick entered the circle of advisers where she distinguished herself as a passionate advocate for military aid to the junta in El Salvador. She was then appointed United States Ambassador to the United Nations.

Finally, sounding Rostow's tireless refrain, Reagan said his administration would refuse to consider arms negotiations and normalized relations with the Soviet Union apart from Soviet behavior in other areas. In other words, Reagan stressed: "I believe in linkage."[18] As the CPD's principal spokesman since its founding, Rostow's contribution had been to lay the alleged machinations of both arms control and human rights on the doorstep of detente, a fall from grace to be halted by the re-assertion of linkage. Reagan was so taken by Rostow that in the preceding year he had labelled a series of his radio editorials Rostow I through Rostow VI. Despite Rostow's unblemished record of disdain for arms negotiations, he was shortly named Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

From the managerial perspective, detente was not the problem but rather the solution. The problem was a world order in flux, spinning out of control. Detente was, in effect, a moderate form of containment, neither phobic about global transformation nor myopic about its source. Its goal: to steer and manage the centrifugal exertions pulling away from the Amercentric postwar order rather than attempt to halt these processes through the threat and use of military force. Carter's human rights and early arms control strategies represented refinements of the underlying thrust of detente. As such, they stood in the way of a return to Containment Militarism and would have to be unceremoniously discarded.

"Human rights" was especially threatening to containment in that it defined the principal axis of global conflict in North-South rather than East-West terms. In his controversial Notre Dame speech, Carter had boldly put forward the thesis that the "threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less

intensive" and the greater threat to peace now came from a world "one-third rich and two-thirds poor." He also let it be known that dictatorial guardians of privilege in the Third World would no longer be granted the automatic moral authority—followed by military aid—enjoyed under the old East-West paradigm. Instead, in truly managerial fashion, Carter hoped to mediate deep and long-standing conflicts between privilege and poverty, utilizing aid leverage to prod recalcitrant regimes toward reform before they were swept away by revolution.

As ideologues who understand the power of ideas, Kirkpatrick and Podhoretz could appreciate the dilemma into which the managerialists had painted themselves: What to do when the reform gambit failed to elicit the desired response? At such a point of impasse a president could either continue to press forward at the risk of toppling faithful servants of U.S. interests like the Shah and Somoza, or maintain U.S. support despite wanton repression—an indefensible position given the most minimal definition of human rights.

The managerial *leitmotif* that "social change" represented the inexorable working out of "historical forces" with which the United States must "cooperate" was especially galling to Kirkpatrick. In the controversial "Dictatorships and Double Standards," she chided statements by Carter, Vance, and even Brzezinski on the futility of force in situations like Iran and Nicaragua. Warming to a final riposte, Kirkpatrick asked rhetorically: "What is the function of foreign policy under these conditions?" Mocking the managerialists, she responded: "It is to understand the processes of change and then, like Marxists, to align ourselves with history, hoping to contribute a bit of stability along the way."[19]

The way out of this quagmire was to turn "human rights" on its head, or more accurately back on its side, by redefining Third World upheaval once again in East-West terms. In this manner, legitimacy would be restored to the upholders of property and defenders of privilege, while popular insurgents would be banished once more from the moral universe—to be labelled "terrorists" and "Soviet proxies." In this way, corporate and geopolitical interests would be protected, public opinion would be kept at bay, protest stifled, and all the while, America could feel good about itself again.

Seen in this light, Reagan's campaign reference to the Vietnam war as a "noble cause" was far more than the inadvertent gaffe which it was labelled at the time by most observers. Reagan had, after all, just praised the publication of Podhoretz' *The Present Danger* as "critically important," a work whose ambition was nothing less than to recast recent history and, by so doing, steer popular political culture back to the path of intervention and containment. Timed to appear at the height of the 1980 election campaign, its thesis was that America's reluctance to flex its military muscle stemmed from a misinterpre-

tation of Vietnam. The mistaken version to which Podhoretz referred was the notion that U.S. involvement had been more than an error of judgment—that it had been immoral. The outcome, he charged, was a nation "Vietnamizing its past, present, and future." Accordingly, in the post-Vietnam period "moral disarmament" had accompanied "military disarmament" with the result that "the domestic base on which containment rested was gone."[40]

During the campaign Reagan had promised repeatedly that his mission to "rearm America" included "moral rearmament" as well as "military rearmament," an Aesopian message that "human rights" was slated for the same fate as "arms control." The early announcement of Kirkpatrick for the UN Ambassadorship followed a few weeks later by the nomination of the CPD's Ernest Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs signalled Reagan's determination to end "human rights" in all but name only.

Lefever, like Kirkpatrick, had built a reputation as one of the most persistent critics of human rights policy even to the point of testifying before the Senate that "the U.S. should remove from statute books all clauses that establish a human rights standard or condition"[41] for the receipt of military and economic aid. In Senate confirmation hearings Lefever acknowledged that while acting as human rights overseer he had discussed with Kirkpatrick an impending UN vote on guidelines to address the promotion of breast milk substitutes in the Third World. The controversy involved the practices of the Nestle Corporation, major marketer of infant formula in the Third World and as it turned out, a donor to Lefever's public policy think tank. After a public campaign was launched against their methods of advertising, Lefever published an article in *Fortune* magazine attacking Nestle's critics as "Marxists marching under the banner of Christ."[42] When the issue finally reached the floor of the United Nations, Kirkpatrick cast the *sole* vote against establishment of a *voluntary* international code. The rationale given for U.S. opposition was that the measure posed a serious threat to the principle of free trade. (The Japanese, who were under pressure at the time to restrict their sale of automobiles in the United States, must have found this new faith in the market grimly amusing.)

If this vote did not lay bare the priority of "corporate rights" over "human rights," Richard Allen removed all doubt on the heels of Lefever's defeat in the Senate. (Even though Lefever failed to be confirmed, largely because of his relationship with Nestle, he still remained in the administration as a special consultant to the Secretary of State.) Responding to what he determined to be confusion over "human rights," Allen clarified the shift in its meaning under Reagan. The national security chief lectured that "'human rights' in the proper sense of the term (are) the rights guaranteed to men under law in any

civilized or human society...the rights not to be deprived arbitrarily of life, liberty, and property." To further enlighten, Allen lectured: "The notion of economic and social rights is a dilution and distortion of the original and proper meaning of human rights, and we need to define it as such."[43] Finally, Allen excused the flagrant violation of even these fundamental rights in Pakistan, South Korea, El Salvador, and other Administration favorites, saying:

> Because we believe, or perhaps because we know that our way of life is best, we may fervently wish that all nations adopt institutions similar to our own. But we are too sensitive to the vast differences in the historical and cultural experience of different societies, and the manifold obstacles many nations face in maintaining even a modest level of political stability to try to impose our own institutions on them.[44]

The minimalist human rights code adopted by the Reagan Administration was unveiled for all the world to see at the conference between rich and poor nations held at Cancun, Mexico. Here in a forum under the auspices of "global negotiations," called to address the widening gap between economically developed and underdeveloped nations, the Administration disparaged the event as a North-South excess unworthy of serious consideration. So adamant was Reagan in his opposition to anything remotely "global" that funding for such established multilateral programs as the International Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank, and the World Bank, was severely slashed in the first year even as the latter made public dire projections of worsening world poverty in the 1980s. In preference to these mainstay institutions of managerialism, Reagan promoted private corporate investment and bilateral aid. Whereas Third World nations went to Cancun to discuss less stringent terms of credit, better access to industrial markets, and cheaper oil for the Third World, Reagan reveled in the "magic of the marketplace" and spun other homilies from his medley of old standards. The U.S. position at the conference was that aid should promote economic growth in a manner closely tied to capitalistic economies—and not simply transfer wealth from the industrialized to the developing world. One pundit termed it "supply-side imperialism."[45]

Cutbacks in multilateral aid through the World Bank and in "no strings attached aid" through UNICEF, the World Food Program, and other international agencies could not be excused in terms of fiscal austerity since overall foreign aid was slated for an increase under Reagan. Bilateral military assistance, for example, was due to rise a whopping 97% in the first year.[46] The CPD's James Buckley, in his position as Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, outlined an aggressive arms promotion policy in the Third World. Buckley affirmed that the Administration saw arms transfers as "an important adjunct to our own security...facilitating access by American forces to

military facilities abroad." Moreover, he charged that the restrictions imposed by Carter—based on considerations of human rights, nuclear proliferation, and unwillingness to be the first to introduce new arms into a region—were part of "an American withdrawal from world responsibilities," itself responsible for Soviet military superiority. Adding insult to injury, Buckley attacked Carter's arms strategy as having "substituted theology for a healthy sense of self-preservation."[47]

As evidence for the new look in Washington, Buckley pointed with pride to one of his first actions after taking office which was to rescind Carter's so-called leprosy letter which had instructed U.S. officials abroad not to assist U.S. arms merchants in peddling their wares. A formal White House statement followed to the effect that arms transfers constituted "an essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component for its foreign policy."[48] By this time, the Administration had approved major sales of advanced aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, South Korea, Pakistan and Venezuela. In 1982, sales were expected to exceed $30 billion, surpassing by far previous record years.[49] While Administration officials billed arms transfers as a boon to the economy, assistance grants totalling several billion dollars were made available for those unable to raise the necessary cash. The new rule guiding U.S. foreign policy, one senior White House official explained, not mincing words, is "it pays to be a friend of the United States."[50]

Among the friends and other beneficiaries of the flood of arms to the Third World were some of the most egregious violators of human rights in the world. Licenses were approved for over $1 million worth of tear gas and police pistols to the government of South Korea for the expressed purpose of "civilian control."[51] At the same time, Reagan reversed a longstanding policy of opposition to multilateral bank loans to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay which had been put in place because of their flagrant records of repression. The Administration also repealed prohibitions on military aid to Argentina.

If these actions were not symbol enough, the day after the Argentina decision, food aid to Mozambique was suspended. Earlier the Administration had blocked a $16 million World Bank loan to Nicaragua for a project to prevent flood damage.[52] The reason given for the decision by the U.S. representative at the Bank's meeting was that "the current macro-economic environment (in Nicaragua) is not conducive to economic development at this time." Then, even wheat flour shipments to Nicaragua were suspended. Meanwhile El Salvador and Guatemala each received allotments of military aid. This despite an Amnesty International report charging the Guatemalan ruling junta with "conducting a government coordinated campaign of terror" against its people.

Kirkpatrick summed up the new U.S. human rights policy well when, upon

returning from a six-nation Latin American tour as UN Ambassador, she reported that the military dictatorships of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile could provide valuable advice to Central America on matters of internal security.[53] Two days after her visit to Chile, during which she publicly praised the policies of General Augusto Pinochet (as Vice President Bush would similarly laud the Marcos regime in an upcoming junket to the Philippines) and announced intentions to "normalize completely relations with Chile in order to work together in a pleasant way," Chilean officials expelled four prominent politicians. One of them was president of the Chilean Commission on Human Rights, who had tried unsuccessfully to schedule a meeting with Kirkpatrick.[54] By October, the Administration had convinced the Senate to repeal the 5-year-old ban on military assistance to the Pinochet regime.

Nowhere, however, was the Administration's wholesale abandonment of human rights and embrace of Cold War interventionism clearer than in El Salvador. Only a few weeks in office, with many in Congress calling for an end to aid because of widespread reports of military massacres and government-sanctioned atrocities, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders pleaded for $155 million of emergency aid and military equipment. Enders' argument was a textbook application of the containment doctrine:

> The dangers are rising fast. The decisive battle for Central America is underway in El Salvador. If, after Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, who in Central America would not live in fear? How long would it be before major strategic U.S. interests—the (Panama) canal, sea lanes, oil supplies—were at risk?[55]

Haig promised soon a full report that would document outside communist support and use of Cuba and Nicaragua as "proxies" and "supply routes." In the meantime he fanned the flames of Enders' apocalyptic cold war scenario, adding:

> What we are watching is a four-phased operation of which phase one has already been completed—the seizure of Nicaragua. Next is El Salvador, to be followed by Honduras and Guatemala...

Asked on the occasion of this congressional hearing if he was spelling out a new domino theory, Haig replied:

> I wouldn't necessarily call it a domino theory. I would call it a priority target list—a hit list, if you will, for the ultimate takeover of Central America.[56]

In the 1950s, when such a paranoid world view enjoyed its greatest popularity, C. Wright Mills called it "crackpot realism."[57] Its revival for the 1980s had been outlined in Kirkpatrick's "U.S. Security and Latin America," a sequel to "Dictatorships and Double Standards" that appeared in *Commentary* simultaneously with Reagan's assumption of power. In her manifesto for intervention, Kirkpatrick lays out the prescription for reversing policy from a

managerial to a militaristic course—ignore "human rights" and support "moderately repressive regimes" that will uphold order; redefine popular struggles as "terrorist campaigns" supported by the Soviet Union and "its proxies."[58] Once adopting such a pantheon of East-West struggle it then became, in the words of senior White House aide Ed Meese, "entirely possible" that the U.S. would take direct action against Cuba. Quite candidly he explained, this was all part of Reagan's larger policy "to have America's foes go to bed each night uncertain what Washington's next move might be."[59] Such a strategy, in turn, would require a vast military buildup to make the threat credible. As NSC-68 had emphasized over a quarter century before: "Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of 'containment'—which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion—is nothing more than a policy of bluff."[60]

For Containment Militarism, "arms control" was as pernicious to its aims as "human rights." If human rights undermined the legitimacy of support for repressive regimes, arms control acted as a similar foil to the nuclear threat that helped keep them in power. As the CPD stressed repeatedly in its analyses, "The strategic deterrent is the fulcrum upon which all other use of military force pivots." The logic of the position was explained as follows: "If Soviet dominance of the strategic nuclear level is allowed to persist, Soviet policymakers may—and almost certainly will—feel freer to use force at lower levels, confident that the United States will shy away from a threat of escalation."[61] In its familiar elliptical style, the barely concealed message was that "U.S. policymakers" as much as their Soviet counterparts would also be "freer to use force at lower levels" with superior nuclear capabilities at their disposal. The Committee couched the point in "defensive" terms, of course, to make it palatable:

> . . . a nuclear balance unfavorable to the West tends to magnify the inadequacies of our general purpose forces. This is particularly so since U.S. and allied strategies for deterring or coping with major conventional conflicts are dependent on a credible threat of nuclear escalation.[62]

Limitations on nuclear arms from the CPD's perspective would therefore constrain and diminish the credibility of intervention through conventional means in regional and internal conflicts. Conversely, closing the publicly-proclaimed "window of vulnerability" through the continual modernization of nuclear forces would widen the privately-coveted vista of opportunity for intervention. In a very direct sense, then, nuclear weapons occupy a central role in dissuading challenges to the present world order—if, that is, one can achieve an edge so that their threatened use will be perceived as credible. Conversely, arms control, which is based on parity, works against the achievement of such a "state of confidence."

In past administrations such hawkish attitudes were kept in check to some extent by more moderate views found in redoubts like the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA is a bureau of some importance in that it shapes policy in the area of arms limitation, and generally, as one would expect, is regarded as an advocate for control. Reagan, however, elected to change radically ACDA's historic role with his appointment of Eugene Rostow as director. Rostow not only shared Reagan's conviction that a decline of U.S. power could be attributed to diminished military strength but was, of course, one of the most passionate and early spokesmen for a reassertion of U.S. military might. Thus, as Lefever's nomination had similarly demonstrated for human rights, the appointment of Rostow to oversee ACDA was a clear signal of Administration intentions to dismantle arms control for all practical purposes. The cast of characters was complete when General Edward Rowny, who had resigned in opposition to Carter's SALT package, was named to head the strategic arms negotiations, and Nitze was called upon to preside over intermediate range talks in Europe.

Even as he was under consideration for the arms control post, Rostow made no effort to moderate his views, offering such dire predictions as "anarchy and war will come" unless the U.S. returns to a policy of containment to arrest the "world crisis caused by the surge of Soviet power since the collapse of our policy in Vietnam."[63] During confirmation hearings, Rostow served up a steady diet of the CPD's cherished nostrums. He told the Senators that the Administration was correct in its commitment to counter militarily the "Soviet drive for empire." Lecturing them on the wisdom of absolute and total linkage, he said that unless the Soviet Union abandoned its "imperial dreams" arms control efforts could not be entertained. Despite Reagan's promise in the final days of the campaign that his Administration would begin negotiations immediately upon assuming office, Rostow quipped: "It may be that a brilliant light will strike our officials. But I don't know anyone who knows what it is yet that we want to negotiate about."[64] Many in the Senate and among the public had a clear sense of what the urgency was about. Even here however, on the issue of human survival itself, Rostow was blasé. The following exchange during the hearings between Rostow and Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island was particularly revealing:

Senator Pell:

> In the event of a full nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, do you envision either country surviving to any substantial degree?

Mr. Rostow:

> So far as the risk of survival is concerned, I suppose the answer to your question is, it depends on how extensive the nuclear exchange is. Japan, after all, not only survived but flourished after the nuclear attack. . .the human race is very resilient, Senator Pell.[65]

What Rostow expounded here was the conviction that nuclear weapons were no longer simply a deterrent to attack, but instead could be prudently used if kept within certain limitations. The full force of such thinking, and the extent to which it had become official policy, was made clear in the Pentagon's *Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance* plan which was leaked to the press in spring 1982. In what was termed the "first complete defense guidance of this Administration" by Pentagon officials, Weinberger ordered the military to prepare for nuclear war against the Soviet Union "over a protracted period."[66] According to the *New York Times*, the Administration's strategic blueprint read that in the event of war with the Soviet Union, if conventional means "are insufficient to ensure a satisfactory termination of the war, the United States will prepare options for the use of nuclear weapons." Further, the guidance plan stated that "the United States must prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." In order to "prevail" the U.S. would require "forces that will maintain, throughout a protracted conflict period and afterward, the capability to inflict very high levels of damage against the industrial and economic base of the Soviet Union and its allies." The plan goes on to explain that such attacks must provide Soviet leaders with "a strong incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities and economic assets." Finally, U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of "controlled nuclear counterattacks over a protracted period while maintaining a reserve" for later "protection and coercion."[67] What this document represents in effect is an expansion of the counterforce strategy set forth in skeletal form in PD-59.

In addition to nuclear war-fighting, the Pentagon plan envisioned an improvement in covert operations over the next five years as well as an even greater emphasis on military aid to "friendly nations." Demonstrating once again the misnomer by which an offensive strategy had been characterized as containment, *Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance* also revealed that "particular attention would be given to eroding support within the Soviet sphere of Eastern Europe." Finally, according to the *Times'* account, the planning document asserted that "the United States and its allies should, in effect, declare economic and technical war on the Soviet Union," a tactic that would shortly be put to the test in the Administration's attempts to block construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline."

Understandably, what was viewed as most disturbing was the article of faith that a nuclear exchange could be "protracted," "limited" through command and control, and that in the end, the U.S. could "prevail." Upon his retirement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones expressed skepticism about such a notion, joining the growing legion of arms experts who had already raised serious reservations about how a nuclear exchange, once begun,

could be prevented from escalating into an all-out holocaust.[69] Moreover, Jones warned: "If you try to do everything to fight a protracted nuclear war, then you end up with the potential of a bottomless pit." The thought had occurred to many observers as they watched the Administration's request for an unprecedented buildup of nuclear weapons including the M-X (now dubbed the Peacekeeper), Pershing II system, the B-1 and Stealth bombers, Cruise missiles, the Trident II countersilo program, the neutron bomb, and billions more for a command, control, communications and intelligence system (C^3I) designed to survive nuclear exchanges, anti-satellite weapons, and even the militarization of outer space.

Reflecting the dominant view within the Administration that the Soviet Union would be unable to match the U.S. in this game of economic brinksmanship, the Pentagon's five-year plan called for weapons which would be "difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of military competition and obsolesce (sic) previous Soviet investment."[70] As two arms experts have observed, Weinberger's guidance blueprint for the 1980s comes "close to a declaration of war on the Soviet Union and contradicts and may destroy...initiatives toward nuclear arms control."[71] It also cast into serious doubt the sincerity of the Administration's proposals put forward in the START and INF arms negotiations, the motives of which, as we will soon see, were clouded in suspicion from the beginning.

The final blow against arms control was delivered when the Administration decided to break off negotiations for a comprehensive test ban (CTB) of nuclear weapons, as well as withdraw from the Senate the earlier negotiated but unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. The outwardly expressed reason for these actions was discovery of alleged inadequacies in test ban verification procedures. One need not look far, however, for a stronger incentive. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Rostow explained: "There is a feeling in many parts of the Government that given the uncertainties of the nuclear situation and *the need for new weapon modernizations, we are going to need testing*, and perhaps testing above the 150 kiloton limit." (Emphasis added.)[72] Since the warheads for the new generation of first-strike counterforce weapons (the MX "peacekeeper," Trident II, Pershing II, and Cruise) had been largely tested by the time of the refusal, the Administration's opposition to a test ban served as an ominous portent of further escalation in weapons technology. Reagan's announcement of intentions to increase the test budget by 30% (as well as hints by both Weinberger and Rostow that the MX once deployed might require an anti-missile system to protect it), only served to confirm these fears.[73]

With human rights policy replaced by traditional counter-revolutionary intervention, and arms control shunted aside in favor of a renewed quest for

weapons superiority, there remained one final legacy of detente—the matter of trade. The CPD and other hardliners had for years argued that extensions of credit and the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would only serve to alleviate domestic pressures, a situation which, in turn, would allow the Soviet leadership to divert still more of its resources to the military sector. Moreover they argued, the institutionalization of commercial ties would not only bail the communist system out of its economic woes but compromise western investors besides. Reagan's decision in June 1982 to impose controls over western bloc corporations in an all-out effort to stop construction of the Siberian natural gas pipeline was the end product of this thinking.

The $250 billion, 25-year pipeline pact, the largest East-West deal in history, had been in planning for several years and was approved in the summer of 1980 under the leadership of the governmental and financial establishment of West Germany. Although the Carter Administration had not objected to the decision, Reagan came into office in adamant opposition and expressed his disapproval of the deal at the Ottawa economic summit of western leaders in July 1981. In lieu of Siberian gas, he offered American coal and nuclear power to discourage the pipeline's completion.

The Europeans showed little interest in the Reagan proposal and continued forward with the project. Then in December, the Polish military government jailed the leaders of Solidarity and imposed martial law over the country. The Administration's reaction, among other measures, was to bar American companies from selling oil and gas equipment or from in any way furthering the pipeline's completion. Attempts to persuade the Europeans to do likewise fell on deaf ears however. The best Washington was able to wring out of its allies was a verbal condemnation issued through NATO, a response which led to considerable dissension within the Reagan camp.

At this point Haig was still in control of Administration policy, much to the chagrin of militarist hardliners. While the former NATO Commander counseled sensitivity to European concerns and cautioned against unilateralism, Administration hawks led by Weinberger and Kirkpatrick mounted a campaign for a full-scale grain and credit embargo of Poland and the Soviet Union. The core of this proposed strategy was to drive Poland to the brink of default on its outstanding loans, forcing the Soviets to make good on Poland's debts or watch it fall into bankruptcy—with all that would mean for future credit in the communist bloc.

Reagan avoided going for the financial jugular however, opting instead for a series of measures which hardliners complained, with justification, were more symbol than substance. High technology exports, for instance, which were banned by Reagan, had already dwindled to a trickle. Future grain nego-

tiations were postponed, but current shipments continued undisturbed. And finally, Soviet commercial aircraft were denied landing rights in the United States. All this a far cry from what the militarists had in mind. The final straw, however, was the Administration's decision to pay the interest installments falling due on Poland's loans. To do otherwise Haig argued, would "bring down the temple of Western unity."

The attack from the various quarters of the cold war coalition came fast and furiously. Senator Moynihan knew Trilateral managerialism when he saw it and called the Administration's response "near to shameful," announcing that he would soon introduce legislation in Congress to declare Poland in default if Reagan would not. Harkening back to the CPD's early assaults on multinational corporations and bankers for their unscrupulous enthusiasm for detente, AFL-CIO president and CPD executive board member Lane Kirkland charged that within the Administration "principled anti-communist ideologues" were being overruled in policy-making by "commercial and banking interests."[74] The Committee for the Free World (CFW), a CPD offshoot chaired by Midge Decter (friend of Kirkpatrick and wife of Podhoretz) was quick to take out a full-page ad in the *New York Times* lamenting Poland's loss of freedom, just as it had done a year earlier in support of the *suppression* of freedom in El Salvador.[75] The former was, of course, totalitarian in Kirkpatrick's formula and deserved condemnation, the latter was authoritarian and did not.

A perusal of the text of the CFW manifesto proved quite revealing. The Polish crisis was declared to be a splendid opportunity to expose "the illusions of detente for what they are." The ad went on to argue that the time was right for a denial of "Western loans, Western grain, and above all Western technology" to Poland as well as the Soviet Union. Interestingly, these measures were portrayed as merely the means to a larger purpose. Demonstrating once again the aggressive designs hidden under the guise of containment, the CFW argued that such a policy strategy would "further the processes of disintegration from within that may mark the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire."[76]

Richard Allen, speaking out for the first time since his ouster as national security chief under the taint of financial scandal, adopted a similar tone of barely concealed glee in the wake of Poland's tragedy. Allen, who continued to serve on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board along with several other members of the CPD, asked: "Are we not now presented with a beautiful opportunity to raise the cost suddenly and dramatically and seize the high ground?" Moreover he suggested, in a criticism directed more at his archrival Haig than toward Reagan, the Administration had missed a golden opportunity to "cripple, weaken" the Soviet Union."

Such talk, both inside and outside the Administration from those closest to Reagan, caused many to worry that he would waver. An Emergency Committee for American Trade representing sixty-three multinational corporations came into being to head off a turn to the right. Echoing big business concern, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce made public a letter to the president which expressed its fear that the Administration appeared to be on the brink of a "profound change (that) could be likened to a strategy of economic warfare."[78] Their sense of unease was well-founded. Even while Reagan adhered to Haig's more moderate course, he intimated that the Soviets had "strained their economy—to the limit" and might be forced into political concessions to avoid economic disaster.[79]

The successful use of trade and credit as leverage was contingent however on European cooperation. Otherwise, as U.S. firms worried, market sacrifices would simply accrue to their competitors in Japan and West Europe who expressed little interest in such a scheme, warning that such coordinated efforts would constitute "an act of war." Nevertheless, shortly before the Versailles summit of western leaders held in June 1982, Weinberger characterized the sale of technology to the Soviet Union as "shortsightedness raised to the level of a crime."[80] Reagan's decision soon after to extend U.S. law over East-West business transactions was intended as the final nail in the coffin of detente. Instead, however, it opened up a Pandora's box onto the tensions already consuming the alliance, a chasm now grown so wide that Haig, finding the Atlantic no longer possible to straddle, resigned from his cabinet post.

Elite Discord and Mass Protest

French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson spoke for a growing chorus in Europe when he suggested that perhaps the time had come for a "progressive divorce" on the grounds that Europe and the United States "no longer speak the same language."[81] The imagery was apropos, if somewhat overdrawn. Each side of the Atlantic establishment still adhered to the language of containment but spoke in different dialects. Given long-term underlying shifts in economic relations within the alliance, especially the increasing strength of the European economies relative to the United States, as well as increasing commercial ties between East and West, the policy struggle pitting militarism against managerialism did not end with Reagan's election but took new form in the widening rift between a militarist America bent on returning to containment and a Europe just as committed to the benefits of trade under a managerial policy of *Ostpolitik*.

Managerialists, who maintained allegiance to detente, believed that the primary crisis facing the West was economic and could be relieved through

still greater East-West trade, a strategy which would at the same time moderate Soviet policy toward the West and lessen the need for military vigilance. Militarists, who had expunged the word detente from their vocabulary, remained steadfast in their opposition to improved economic relations on the grounds that western security would become compromised as a result. Ostensibly this was due to the Soviet's sinister design for world domination, beginning with Western Europe. A darker motivation throughout the cold war, however, has been the American foreign policy establishment's concern with disintegration of the Pax Americana beginning at its European center, irrespective of the driving force.

If the strategy of Containment Militarism has remained unchanged in thirty years, the world it hopes to redress has undergone profound changes. So much so that its application has wrought near opposite results from those intended. Whereas the Soviet Union was successfully portrayed as militaristic and isolated from Western Europe in the 1950s, the same tactic applied thirty years later has caused Europeans to distance themselves from Washington. Whereas European neutralism, the great fear of NSC-68, was averted through military integration in NATO, the attempt by Reagan to strengthen U.S.-European relations through cold war hostility in the 1980s has driven a wedge in the western partnership.

What has changed across this span of time is that the U.S., no longer in such a preeminent position, is unable to guarantee that European nations will have more to gain than lose by falling in line behind U.S. policy. In fact the costs seem to outweigh the benefits the more U.S. policy attends to narrow nationalistic interest to stem the decline of America's economic and political power. Nowhere was this more the case than the pipeline decision which was interpreted in Europe as evidence that the U.S. no longer had the capacity to exercise world leadership, even as Reagan demanded continued fealty to a world order fast becoming relegated to the past.

The cold war thaw had been of particular benefit to Europe where a higher rate of productivity during the 1970s, geographical proximity, and closer cultural ties, led Western Europe to take greater advantage of detente with the Soviet Union and especially its Eastern counterparts than did the United States. The increase in European trade between East and West rested on a natural affinity of interests. Each potentially had much to offer the other. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe needed western technology and capital, and Western Europe needed the markets, cheaper labor, and energy resources of the communist bloc. The latter was especially important given Western Europe's dependency on Mideast oil, a factor which made Siberian reserves of natural gas look especially attractive. Standing in the way of realizing the full potential of a mutually beneficial economic relationship were East-West

ideological differences institutionalized in the military alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

European leaders were understandably angered by Reagan's cavalier disregard of their economic interests and, of course, of their national sovereignty. They were particularly incensed with what they read as U.S. intent to force them to bear the burden of economic warfare. As then West German Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt tirelessly pointed out, his country was far more dependent on East-West trade than either the U.S. or the USSR, and therefore would lose the most in an economic boycott. European sensibilities were especially piqued that the Reagan Administration found the sale of U.S. grain within the bounds of prudence, while demanding that Europe stop the flow of credit and technology. (Reagan's argument that the one forced the Russians to give up hard currency while the other resulted in its accumulation was distinguished only by its lack of persuasiveness.) If that were not enough, Reagan's economic policies (especially tight money and high interest rates) had brought on recession in Europe making the profits and jobs to come from the long-term pipeline commitment that much more attractive. Taken together with restrictions on the import of European steel into the U.S. to protect domestic producers, many began to talk divorce—progressive or otherwise.

If the Administration's economic warfare strategy rankled Europe's elites, its nuclear war-fighting strategy aroused the ire of the European people. This drama was not confined to the salons of Versailles however, but instead swept across the continent in a wave of mass protest that reached American shores by the end of Reagan's first year. The currency in this case was not profits but survival, the motivation not advantage but community, the challenge not just to containment tactics but to the cold war system itself.

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Barely a month in office, during the same period in which the Administration was busy drawing lines in El Salvador, Reagan hinted in an interview in the French magazine *Le Figaro* that the U.S. would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in Europe.[82] Coming from anyone else this might have been accepted, however uneasily, as standard NATO policy. But, given the bellicose pronouncements from Reagan and his cabinet in those first days, along with their posturing in El Salvador, Europeans were understandably nervous at this early injunction. Anxieties were hardly allayed when Richard Allen in his first public address as national security adviser levelled the blast that Europe was "beset by a dangerous 'better Red than dead' attitude and outright pacifist sentiments."[83] Allen's remarks had themselves followed fast on the heels of Richard Pipes' assessment that the Soviet Union, to avoid nuclear war, would

have to change its system. In this same diatribe, Pipes had also intimated that the West German foreign minister might be susceptible to Soviet influence.[14]

Such virulent rhetoric only confirmed Europe's worst fears of U.S. militarism under Reagan. While Washington urged its NATO allies to commit a larger share of their budgets to the military, they in turn reminded the Administration that their agreement to accept the new generation of Pershing II and Cruise missiles on European soil had been made with the understanding that arms negotiations would be conducted in the interim before actual deployment, the so-called two-track agreement. In his talk, Allen dismissed the "advocacy of arms control negotiations as a substitute for military strength" as just one more manifestation of the retreatist mood.[15] Weinberger's and Rostow's pronouncements that arms control would be held in abeyance indefinitely only added to the fear that the U.S. was restructuring NATO not to deter, but to fight a nuclear war in Europe.

Given the climate of distrust that prevailed, Weinberger's announcement that the Administration planned to go ahead with production of the neutron bomb sent shock waves through Europe. In response, the Copenhagen daily *Ekstra Bladet* ran a full-page photograph of Reagan with the banner headline: "Crazy." And in Amsterdam, protesters waved placards denouncing "Reagan, the Neutron cowboy."[16] In Bonn, the movement in the streets carried into the Bundestag where Chancellor Schmidt's SDP formally split with their standard bearer over his tacit acceptance of the neutron bomb. In early October, on the occasion of a Weinberger visit to Germany, an estimated 250,000 people (largest demonstration in West Germany's history) poured into Bonn to denounce deployment of U.S. missiles on German soil. Weinberger's response was to assail this dangerous and growing "neutralism" with a studied disdain that only reinforced America's unilateralist cowboy image.

Such remarks were typical of the Administration's inability to refrain from provocative and alarmist pronouncements at the worst possible time. With the Defense Secretary attending another NATO meeting in Europe in the fall of 1981, Reagan confirmed the darkest fears of the Europeans when he said that he could envision a nuclear war limited to the European continent.[17] If that were not enough, Haig in defending Reagan's remarks blurted out the possibility that NATO might set off a "nuclear bomb for demonstration purposes...to demonstrate to the other side they are exceeding the limits of toleration in the conventional areas."[18] Attempting to dampen down the controversy but in the process only making it worse, NATO Secretary General Joseph Lun confirmed that all this was consistent with NATO policy. Thus what had originally been intended as a decision to relink U.S. strategic forces with NATO was now seen as an attempt by the U.S. to keep any conflict limited to Europe.

In Rome and London that weekend nearly one-half million protesters joined their Bonn counterparts in record turnouts against the nuclear buildup. The Rome demonstration was of particular importance in that Germany had earlier declared it would not be the only nation on the continent to deploy the new Pershing II missiles. With Italy added to the "unstable" list, no country was definite in its commitment. These demonstrations in turn were joined by marches of more than a quarter million persons through the streets of Paris, Brussels, Oslo, and Madrid, among other lesser protests. In all, several million Europeans had participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations by the end of November (1981). Weinberger responded characteristically saying that he didn't believe the massive outpouring "really signifies anything."[89]

With mass protest threatening the stability of governing coalitions in Europe, their attempt to distance themselves from Washington was creating the unthinkable—that the Atlantic alliance itself, the core of the empire, was in danger of breakdown. Swerving to avoid such a course before it was too late, the Administration showed a sudden interest in arms negotiations. Reagan offered to cancel the new generation of intermediate-range missiles destined for Europe (108 Pershing II's and 464 Cruise missiles) if the Soviets dismantled those they had already deployed (600 SS-4's, SS-5's and SS-20's). This so-called "zero-option" was unveiled in what was billed as Reagan's "first major foreign policy speech."[90] In an extraordinary effort to reach European opinion, the United States paid the costs of televising the President's address by satellite to Europe.

This move told the story. The proposal was more clearly intended to deflect the European peace movement than to negotiate a serious arms agreement with the Soviet Union. The Russian reaction was expectedly negative since they were being asked to dismantle weapons already in place for a promise that the U.S. would not deploy missiles of their own in the future. Moreover, from the Russian point of view, the offer was hardly in good faith since it failed to include U.S. forward-based systems already operational on sea and in the air capable of reaching Soviet territory. Nor for that matter were British and French nuclear forces included in the equation.

Underscoring the hardline stance the Administration planned to take into the talks scheduled to begin November 30 (1981), Paul Nitze was named as chief negotiator. When asked by the *Los Angeles Times* about the worth of engaging in arms negotiations, Nitze replied, "It would be first necessary to redress the nuclear balance." Queried as to when that might be, he estimated, "Possibly ten years."[91] As one observer was quick to note upon the appointment, "In the world of nuclear weaponry, Paul Nitze is not known as Mr. Arms Control. He is Mr. Arms Buildup, and has been for more than 30 years."[92]

On the day the negotiations opened in Geneva, Rostow as the Administra-

tion's chief arms control spokesman, delivered a speech in London where he reiterated the theme of relentless Soviet expansion and complained that existing arms treaties "have turned into ashes in our mouths." Downplaying the significance of Nitze's mission, Rostow explained that "negotiations have no magic in themselves."[93] Thus while Reagan and Haig attempted to court public opinion in Europe and recover from their own disastrous gaffes on "warning shots" and "limited nuclear exchanges," the presence of Nitze and the candor of Rostow spoke volumes for the Administration's intentions.

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Meanwhile, like the peoples of Europe, increasing numbers of Americans had reached the conclusion that their President was preparing to fight a nuclear war—one that would involve strategic intercontinental exchanges, as well as theater strikes "limited" to Europe. This suspicion was brought home quite vividly in the macabre plans unveiled by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for mass evacuations from U.S. cities under the guise of "civil defense." FEMA declared that "the United States could survive a nuclear attack and go on to recovery within a few years"—the same unsettling opinion expressed by Rostow in his confirmation hearings.[94]

Surreal planning began to filter out of Washington for homemade recreational bomb shelters, evacuation from cities by odd- and even-numbered auto license plates, and instructions for post-attack mail delivery, convincing more and more people that the Administration had taken leave of its senses. In town forums and teach-ins throughout the spring, those who still needed additional evidence were treated to devastating presentations by medical experts that made a mockery of Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (for Strategic and Nuclear Forces) T.K. Jones' widely quoted remark that, "Everybody is going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around."[95]

By May, a nationwide Ground Zero education week on nuclear war had drawn thousands in every state of the union, and a nuclear freeze proposal calling for the immediate halt in the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, to be followed by major reductions in weapons stockpiles, had the support of a majority of the American public.[96] In response to this groundswell, the freeze resolution was introduced in Congress as the Kennedy-Hatfield Amendment, a proposal that drew the backing of 180 lawmakers. The freeze idea was so popular, in fact, that its detractors had to cloak their attack as an alternative freeze proposal—in effect, a continuation of the arms buildup until such time as the "Soviet advantage" had been overcome. Introduced as the Jackson-Warner amendment, this competing resolution en-

visioned freeze negotiations with the Soviets only after both sides were equal. In short, arm now, freeze later—if ever.

Reagan's reaction to the challenge at home was similar to his response when the European movement erupted some six months earlier. On May 9, addressing the graduating class of his alma mater at Eureka College in Illinois, he suggested an opening date for the much-delayed strategic arms reduction talks (START). (Since the creator of the new acronym was Eugene Rostow, one could be forgiven for taking the proposal with a grain of salt.)

After castigating the Soviet Union for spreading "violence and suffering" in Central America and elsewhere, and increasing the threat of nuclear war, the President got around to the terms of the START proposal. In substance, once unveiled, START bore striking resemblance to the intermediate-range offer in that it too called for cutbacks in weapons, again with most of the cutting to be done by the Soviet Union. The heart of START was its call for a reduction in the number of warheads to 5000 on each side with no more than half being land-based. Since approximately 70% of the Soviet warhead arsenal is land-based in comparison to only about 20% of the U.S. force, the Soviets would have to dismantle some 3,260 land-based warheads while the U.S. remained within acceptable limits. Moreover, a second phase of START would seek equal ceilings on megatonnage or throw-weight, a formula that would again disproportionately affect the Soviets because of the heavy weapons on which they rely to offset the U.S. advantage in warheads of greater number and accuracy. Finally, with U.S. plans for modernization left undisturbed by START, Soviet land-based missiles would become even more vulnerable to submarine-launched cruise missiles, the B-1 and Stealth bombers, and the M-X, once this new generation of weapons was deployed. In essence, as noted by Leslie Gelb of the *New York Times*, the proposal asks the Soviets "to trade the present for the future: If the USSR made significant cuts now, the U.S. would curtail a major buildup later."[97]

Revelations of Pentagon plans for nuclear war-fighting dashed whatever hopes the Administration had that the announcement of START talks would quell the mass demonstrations planned for the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSD II) in New York. On June 12, 1982, the largest demonstration in U.S. history was held outside the United Nations when over 700,000 people gathered to protest the arms race. This was followed by the arrest of 1,691 protesters who conducted sit-ins at the embassies of the world's five nuclear powers. Most took place at the U.S. Mission. The response of officialdom to the mass plea was telling. While West German Chancellor Schmidt admonished world leaders not to ignore the global drive for disarmament, Weinberger stubbornly maintained that it would have no effect on U.S. policy.

Reagan showed the same contempt for the proceedings inside as Weinberger

expressed for the demonstrations in the street. Fresh from speeches in London and Bonn where he promised in particularly ill-chosen words to "leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history," Reagan refused to join with the Soviet Union in a pledge to the world body not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Dismissing Brezhnev's assurance in this regard as "propaganda," he instead used the opportunity to lash out in standard stump fashion against the USSR's "record of tyranny." On the arms race itself, the subject of the convocation, all Reagan could say was that "the decade of detente witnessed the most massive Soviet military buildup of military power in history. . . . While we exercised unilateral restraint, they forged ahead." Finally, in concluding his show of disrespect for the disarmament gathering, Reagan insinuated that the burgeoning peace movement was under the influence of Moscow, a theme he would repeat again as time drew near for the midterm Congressional elections and a vote on nuclear freeze referenda in several states across the nation."

Alongside growing anti-nuclear sentiment, the failure of Reaganomics has played a critical role in the challenge to Containment Militarism. Military spending from 1981 to 1986 is slated to double from $162 billion to $343 billion, with total cost exceeding $1.7 trillion. The Pentagon's share of the federal budget will be increased from 25% to nearly 40% as a result of Reagan's tenure." All this, the public was told, could be accomplished while corporations and wealthy individuals enjoyed tax cuts in accord with supply-side fantasies of robust growth and gutted social programs, the combination of which was supposed to add up to a balanced budget. George Bush, before he became Vice President, called it voodoo economics. Budget Director David Stockman confirmed the accuracy of Bush's assessment in his insider's revelations in *The Atlantic* on the eve of the Administration's first anniversary.

By spring 1982, as Congress faced the largest military budget and the largest budget deficit in the nation's history, it was clear that the magic wasn't working. The only economic growth in sight was at the Pentagon, where defense spending was due for an 11% increase after inflation.[100] The fact that the biggest increase would take place in the purchase of weapons (28.4%) meant that these enormous sums would be "locked in" to future budgets since the monies already authorized would show up as outlays in future years as the weapons were built and delivered. To make matters worse, these figures did not take into account the huge cost overruns endemic to weapons procurement that would in the end inflate the cost of arms well beyond their contracted price.

The upshot of the Pentagon's increasing monopoly of societal resources portends still a larger deficit, higher interest rates, and further slowdown of the economy. The President's own Council of Economic Advisers predicted that the proposed increase in military spending would create "adverse eco-

nomic effects" including "crowding out of private investment."[101] They have been right. This in turn has brought about a further adverse effect in that dollars available for research and development, and plant and equipment modernization have been fewer, hastening the decline in U.S. ability to compete in international trade with its European and Japanese allies.[102] The final link in this chain of causality has been forged in the pressure brought to bear on NATO and Japan to increase their defense spending to offset the negative impact of hyper-active militarism on the U.S. economy, a move itself destined to further erode the tenuous supports of the western alliance.[103]

All this taken together, along with mounting unemployment and a social "safety net" scheduled for still further shredding, it has begun to dawn on all but the most diehard militarists that the Pentagon budget can no longer be considered sacrosanct if the decline in the nation's economy and society is to be halted. In so doing, their numbers add to the ranks of those alarmed not just by America's relative decline, but with the possibility of its absolute destruction.

At the Crossroads

Since January 1981 the world has witnessed the working out of the inexorable logic of Containment Militarism. In contrast to the tortuous inconsistencies of trilateral managerialism which sought a foreign policy that would further East-West detente and North-South accommodation and all the while turn them to U.S. advantage, Reagan's formula was far easier to follow. The argument went that U.S. national interests could not possibly be served if the postwar empire continued to erode. Therefore, that being so, East-West as well as North-South relations would have to be recast in the traditional imagery of cold war containment. Moreover, the particular brand of containment favored was one based on the belief that the zero-sum world of Pax Americana could best be maintained through the display of superior military force. Codified in NSC-68, the world view of Containment Militarism was recalled to active duty for the 1980s as were many of its architects and long-time adherents to put it into practice.

Midway through Reagan's term of office however, the spectacular success of Containment Militarism in electoral politics has been matched by the degree to which it has failed as a foreign policy. The more Reagan and the coterie of cold warriors that surround him have attempted to beat the world of the 1980s back into a cold war configuration in the image of the 1950s, the more resistant that world has become until finally, the ringing promise that "peace through strength" and national prestige could be recovered by "rearming America"

has sounded a shrill and increasingly discordant note at home as well. Thus the Reagan policies have brought on what they sought to avoid and in so doing, have hastened our arrival at the political crossroads where we now stand.

When managerialism surrendered, the best hope for survival of a post-Vietnam Pax Americana went with it. Moving into the Reagan Administration with its self-proclaimed mandate for confrontation in hand, the CPD-led hardliners sowed seeds of contention that rocked each axis of world order—renewed cold war hostility and a heightened arms race between East and West; suppression of human rights and resurgent interventionism in North-South relations; and a protectionist and divisive mood where Western unity once prevailed. Given this undaunted record of belligerence, one might hazard the proposition that the greater the success Containment Militarism enjoys in the elite world of policy, the more precipitous the decline of U.S. influence in the real world beyond.

To state why this should be so is to recognize the obvious. The world has undergone changes of epochal dimension across the period that separates what some have called Cold War I in the 1950s and Cold War II in the 1980s. The bipolar, zero-sum world view of containment seems quaint and clearly out of place as a framework for the increasingly complex and multipolar system of nation-states in the late twentieth century. The ill-fated and maladroit attempts to subsume struggles for social justice in Central America under an archetypal East-West rubric, for example, have been met with incredulity abroad and *deja-vu* at home. Reagan discovered that the U.S. no longer has the unilateral power much less the requisite legitimacy to sally forth into Latin America and change governments as it did in 1954 in Guatemala, or to suppress popular movements of which it does not approve as was true in 1965 in the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, the long imperial arm of Pax Americana still has the reach to make revolutionary change a drawn-out and costly undertaking as has been demonstrated with the massive military aid to the junta in El Salvador, covert aid to Guatemala, and the use of Honduras as a staging area for regional intervention.

Efforts to gain the support of traditional allies in such Third World adventures have, since Vietnam, met with failure. Western Europe's overwhelming endorsement of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and condemnation of the U.S.-backed regime in El Salvador were only the latest examples of what had become widely divergent views toward the South. As the U.S. sought to halt movements for national self-determination and social transformation through crude cold war militarist formulas like that of the Kirkpatrick doctrine, Europe took the managerial tack of tethering and "moderating" such forces through economic ties and more favorable terms of trade.

The growing independence of Europe's foreign policy (and to a less dramatic extent that of Japan, the other Trilateral partner) as well as its preferred pattern of relations with the Third World, is the product of long-term structural shifts in the international order which have only been accelerated by Reagan's policies. The most fundamental of these has been the higher-growth and greater-productivity rates of the European and Japanese economies relative to that of the United States. The greater balance in economic strength has created in turn the basis for a more independent politics, a situation only hastened by competition for existing as well as new markets. Under these circumstances, both sides of the Atlantic (as well as Pacific) now play to their strengths—the Europeans and Japanese whose economic stars are rising emphasize economic relations with the Third World, and in foreign policy generally. The U.S., in contrast, still the undisputed leader in military strength places the accent of its foreign policy on traditional security alliances and the threat of armed intervention.

The differing strategies in North-South relations are even more pronounced in East-West matters as was made apparent on the Soviet pipeline issue. What it symbolized has become the subject of considerable alarm to cold warriors, as it had been at the time NSC-68 was written in 1950. Western European allegiance to a rigid East-West divide was the cornerstone of containment policy. The great fear then as now was not a Soviet military threat to Europe but a free and independent continent exercising its sovereignty and charting its own course in world affairs, a condition known pejoratively as "neutralism." The way to block such a setback to the nascent empire of 1950, NSC-68 had reasoned, was to place American troops on European soil and to cover its western portion with a nuclear umbrella. In this manner, economic concessions and political tribute could be exacted in return for military security. It goes without saying that such a strategy made essential a Soviet Threat then, just as it requires one now. The difference however is that the increasing dependency on East-West trade cannot be offset by American markets in today's recession climate. Indeed, the more they are restricted by protectionism, the more attractive markets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union become—the less so U.S. nuclear missiles.

Reagan's policies have only brought these tensions to a sharper and earlier peak as governments, such as that of Helmut Schmidt in West Germany, have found themselves torn between a confrontational U.S. posture that goes against both its economic interests and its own citizens' alarm over preparations for tactical nuclear warfare in Europe. The more shrill the Administration's rhetoric has become, the more Western Europe has urged reconciliation with the East.

Finally, the mass politicization that swept Europe and threatens to break

the hold of cold war institutions and ideologies there has engulfed the United States as well. Reagan's revival of Containment Militarism, as we have seen, has been perhaps the greatest mobilizing force behind the resurgent peace movement. The American public, like their European counterparts, began to question how it would be possible to "fight a limited nuclear war" and what it would mean to "prevail" in the aftermath of such a holocaust. At the same time, as the Administration's strategy became known it portended an awesome shift of resources from the already ailing civilian economy to the expanding military colossus. In the name of national security the Pax Americana was fast coming to threaten the American way of life it professed to protect.

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Approaching the *terra incognita* ahead, one can count on the attempted resurrection of managerialism in some variant or other. Its limitations in the Carter period are however only magnified today. Even with Reagan's severe reductions in social spending—impossible for a Democratic president—the military buildup continues to squander that capital and more, which might be used to make managerialism's global strategy viable even in theory. Politically, the pressing issue of protection for domestic industries in a climate of deepening recession makes managerialism even less palatable than earlier however and foredooms its revival.

History, both long-term and recent, points to the likelihood of a continuing emphasis on Containment Militarism in U.S. policy. The once radical notion that the world economic system has entered a period of stagnation and decline is now approaching orthodoxy. After a long wave of expansion in the post-World War II period, a downturn in productive growth was visible as early as 1967 and generally conceded by 1973. Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein, among an increasing number of contemporary theorists, argue independently that the current downturn is only the latest swing in a cyclical pattern in which stagnation and decline follows expansion as inexorably as night follows day.[104] The reason lies in the uneven nature of industrial development, specifically in the vagaries of capital accumulation. When productive capacity exceeds consumer demand, a crisis in the accumulation process occurs and can be measured by a fall in productivity rates, profits, and investment, each of which is a prominent and persistent feature of the current era.

The dynamic of capital accumulation is not only uneven, it is also unequal in that while all economies are affected, some experience these vicissitudes more so than others. This in turn results in a reshuffling of the international hierarchy as each nation vies to reduce its costs of production by lowering wages, exporting capital in search of cheaper labor, and investing in tech-

nologies which ultimately come to form the basis for a new epoch of expansion. Nations able to recover quickly then ride the new wave of growth toward global power—first economic, then political, and finally military. Correspondingly, in periods of stagnation, hegemonic powers decline in the same sequential order. Therefore one would expect a continuation of the current trend toward an increasingly militarized foreign policy in response to the decline of the Pax Americana.

Recent history since Vietnam suggests that Containment Militarism will be met with fierce resistance by anti-systemic movements in the Third World and anti-hegemonic tendencies within the Trilateral alliance. As regards the former, imposition of austerity measures in the South to stem mounting debt may turn so-called "IMF riots" into full-fledged IMF revolutions. In the case of Europe, the anti-nuclear movement there may well reshape the political map by creating a united and neutral continent, or even a re-alignment along the lines posed by both Wallerstein and Frank—what they call a Bonn-Paris-Moscow axis to offset a possible alliance of Washington-Peking-Tokyo. If the past is any guide, political transformations and social convulsions of such magnitude are not exaggerated. The last downside of the cycle extended from 1914–1945, an epoch that saw the socialist revolutions of the Soviet Union and China, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism, and two world wars, before the establishment of the Pax Americana ushered in a new wave of economic growth and political stasis.

But how much can we rely upon past history—pre-nuclear history—to fathom our present course? It would scarcely be a source of comfort to know that the carnage of two world wars was followed by a period of prosperity even if the means of violence had not undergone a quantum leap in the process. Now that we have crossed the nuclear threshold, it would be the height of folly to bank on a similar recovery from a third world war. And yet, given the present momentum of global militarization, driven by nuclear proliferation both vertical and horizontal, what are the chances of avoiding such a fate? Not good if we couch it in these terms. In this regard, Jonathan Schell in *The Fate of the Earth* departs from his title and suggests that our destiny does not ride on fate at all, but human will: "Two paths lie before us," he writes, "One leads to death, the other to life."[105] That, nothing less, is the political crossroads we have come to.

How deeply militarism is rooted in America's political culture has become the most profound question of our time. It is one certain to be probed in the years ahead as the interplay of structural forces and resistance movements exact a demanding toll as compared to the salad days of Containment Militarism when "empire as a way of life" could be conducted by means of cost-free nuclear threats and low-budget interventions. But the real litmus test will

come when a challenge is mounted to the proposition that resistance to empire abroad is *pari passu* a threat to security at home, the heart of containment orthodoxy.

If the short-lived era of detente and the dynamics of the post-Vietnam period are any guide, this challenge cannot be expected from managerial elites within the Establishment who share the underlying militarist goal of empire, even as they disagree on the most effective means toward its achievement. It must come instead from those without a stake either in containment or militarism, who recognize the true interdependence and indivisibility which is both the burden and the promise of the contemporary world. The prospects of such a popular awakening, while far from sanguine, have begun to appear on the political horizon.

Given the success of the Committee on the Present Danger in harnessing mass support for Containment Militarism in the intra-elite policy struggle of the post-Vietnam period, this assessment might appear odd at first glance. After all, as noted earlier, the New Right and neo-conservative politics of *ressentiment* carried Ronald Reagan and the Committee on the Present Danger to power. Nevertheless, even as the 1970s ended sporting automobile bumper stickers exhorting "Let's Play Cowboys and Iranians" and "Nuke the Ayatollah," the 1980s dawned with mass demonstrations demanding "No More Vietnams" and calling for a freeze on nuclear weapons. What Reagan and the CPD have discovered is that mass politicization cuts two ways in periods of crisis. The Soviet Threat worked exceedingly well against managerialism in the Carter years, but the fear that has moved people to political action during Reagan's term is not of communism but nuclearism, not just of Moscow but of Washington as well.

If earlier periods of systemic crisis can be used as a guidepost, we can expect the continued mobilization of both the mass politics of *ressentiment* as well as of peace and non-intervention. The former, featuring ever-durable and highly adaptable forms of jingoism, racism, and xenophobia, is always appealing in times of perceived national decline. One can be certain that its depths will be plumbed by the CPDs of the present and future. Indeed, it is only by working mass sentiment into such a nationalistic froth that people can possibly be mesmerized to "stay the course" and acquiesce in $200 billion plus military budgets in an era of economic stagnation and societal decay. Carried to its logical end, the continuing pursuit of empire will require a fascist society and a garrison state, an indulgence with which we can ill-afford to flirt in an age when official violence has attained such overwhelming reach and power.

Counterpoised to the cult of nuclear militarism is the burgeoning movement for peace and non-intervention which in its freeze initiative has moved beyond the sterile debates between militarists who want to win the arms race regardless

of cost, and managerialists who want to rationalize the competition but continue the race nonetheless. This, and other such imaginative efforts, threaten the arcane preserve of national security which until now has been defined by a priesthood of elites immune from public review. The inchoate and still largely intuitive grasp that the security of East and West is indivisible, that absolute national security is impossible in an insecure world, hold out promise of revolutionizing the concept of defense and leaving behind the obsession with containment.

Whether its potential is realized will depend much upon the ability of the peace issue to make the transition from a cultural phenomenon that gains its identity from public opinion polls to a political force possessed of an agenda for social transformation. The key to building such a broad-based constituency lies in the uncoupling of the empire-security linkage, a process ironically set in motion already by Reaganomics. Under the economic circumstances of the 1950s and 1960s, the military Keynesian marriage of guns and butter became possible, an arrangement that secured a popular base for the ideological bond between empire and security. In the very different economic climate of the 1980s, Reagan's policies divorced guns from butter, in the process sacrificing security at home to uphold the primacy of empire abroad. In a desperate attempt to bolster the hobbled Pax Americana, the American people have been served notice that security in any meaningful sense—from affordable housing to retirement benefits, environmental protection to jobs, public education to health care—must be sacrificed to the Moloch of empire. Thus a dismantled Pax Americana is now a matter of common interest to non-elites whether they reside in the East, the West, the North or the South.

When historians look back on the last decades of this century, their judgment might begin: "It was the worst of times and the best of times." Which will prevail depends on the outcome of the struggle still to be waged. Whether people are yet ready to accept the demystification of Containment Militarism remains to be seen. But clearly the time has come to find out.

FOOTNOTES

[1]William Appleman Williams, "Empire as a Way of Life," *The Nation*, August 2-9, 1980.

[2]Much has been written on the origins of the national security state. For a representative sympathetic account, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Belknap, 1957), pp. 271-272. A corresponding critical view is provided by Richard J. Barnet in *Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), pp. 52-53.

[3]See Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston: South End Press, 1983).

[4]For an extensive treatment of the Great Debate and the campaign of the original Committee on the Present Danger, see Jerry Sanders, "Shaping the Cold War Consensus: The Soviet Threat, Interelite Conflict, and Mass Politics in the Korean War Era," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. xxv (1980), pp. 67–137; also *ibid.*

[5]The first issue of *Foreign Policy* explained that "in the light of Vietnam, the basic purposes of American foreign policy demand re-examination and redefinition" and—in an obvious reference to the Council on Foreign Relations journal *Foreign Affairs*—"a new magazine with a keener awareness that an era in American foreign policy which began in the late 1940's, has ended." See 'Why Foreign Policy?' *Foreign Policy*, No. 1 (Winter 1970–1971), p. 3.

[6]Trilateral Commission, *Towards a Renovated International System* (The Triangle Papers, No. 14, 1977).

[7]As trilateralist Richard N. Gardner wrote "...the facts of interdependence force nations in their enlightened self-interest, to abandon unilateral decision-making in favor of multilateral processes." See Richard N. Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1974), p. 563.

[8]For an elaboration of the militarist world view, based largely on interviews with members of the Committee on the Present Danger, see Sanders (Note 3).

[9]Eugene Rostow, *SALT II—A Soft Bargain, a Hard Sell: An Assessment of SALT in Historical Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Committee on the Present Danger, 1978), p. 13.

[10]Jeane Kirkpatrick (Interview with author, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1977).

[11]Correspondence from Eugene V. Rostow to author, July 25, 1977; Paul H. Nitze (Interview with author, Washington, D.C., August 24, 1977).

[12]A generation earlier, the original Committee on the Present Danger legitimated Containment Militarism under the similar guise of an imminent Soviet threat. The *raison d'etre* of this CPD maneuver, declassified documents and private communications show, was also to contain a challenge to US hegemony from within—in this case a neutralist course in Europe—rather than Soviet penetration from without. See Sanders (Note 3).

[13]In this regard, see George B. Kistiakowsky, "False Alarm: The Story Behind SALT II," *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1979), pp. 33–38; E.P. Thompson, "A Letter to America," *The Nation*, January 24, 1981; Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat* (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980); Fred Kaplan, *Dubious Specter: A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Nuclear Threat* (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980); as well as Richard J. Barnet, *Real Security: Restoring American Power in a Dangerous Decade* (New York: Touchstone, 1981).

[14]For a treatment of this critical period, see Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders, "Resurgent Cold War Ideology," in *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, (ed.) Richard R. Fagen (Stanford University Press, 1979).

[15]The Emergency Coalition against Unilateral Disarmament (anti-Warnke) included on its steering committee such key representatives of the ultra-right as James G. Roberts, Executive Director of the American Conservative Union; Charles R. Black, former Chairman of the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC); Howard Phillips, National Director of the Conservative Caucus; Paul Weyrich, Director of the Committee for Survival of a Free Congress (formerly of the Heritage Foundation); and Morton Blackwell, editor of Conservative Digest and The Right Report (both published by New Right direct-mail wizard Richard Viguerie). Blackwell served as Executive Director of the Emergency Coalition.

[16]The Carter proposal was a major departure from the Vladivostok interim arms control agreement in that it called for deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces, particularly of heavy land-based missiles upon which the Soviets are greatly dependent. Thus, it was not surprising that the

Soviets rejected the Carter initiative as "unrealistic." See Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sanders (Note 14), pp. 61-62.

[17]See William Schneider, "Public Opinion: The Beginning of Ideology?" *Foreign Policy, 17* (Winter 1974-1975), pp. 88-120; also William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, "Nationalism, Not Isolationism," *Foreign Policy*, No. 24 (Fall 1976), pp. 3-25.

[18]Committee on the Present Danger, *Common Sense and the Common Danger*, November 1976, p. 5.

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[20]George C. Wilson, "U.S. Constituency Favoring Arms Buildup Seen Growing," *Washington Post*, January 2, 1977.

[21]The Gallup Poll, January 30-February 2, 1976, *Current Opinion*, No. 4, April 4, 1976.

[22]William Watts and Lloyd A. Free (Note 7), p. 23.

[23]Norman Podhoretz, "Making the World Safe for Communism," *Commentary*, April 1976, p. 41.

[24]*The Congressional Quarterly*, June 23, 1979, p. 1217.

[25]Memorandum to Friends and Supporters of the Committee on the Present Danger from Eugene V. Rostow, Chairman, Executive Committee, 5 December 1979.

[26]*The Congressional Quarterly*, June 23, 1979. pp. 1217-1218.

[27]*Newsweek*, April 2, 1979, p. 37; also *Washington Post*, May 21, 1979, p. A-15.

[28]Karen Rothmyer, "Citizen Scaife," *Columbia Journalism Review*, July-August 1981, p. 41.

[29]Paul Warnke, "Apes on a Treadmill," *Foreign Policy*, No. 18 (Spring 1975).

[30]For discussion of these Janus-faced trends, see Louis Kriesberg, Harry Murray, and Ross A. Klein, "Elites and Increased Public Support for U.S. Military Spending," paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, August 1981; Committee on the Present Danger *Public Attitudes on SALT II*, March 15, 1979; "Carter Launches SALT Campaign; Hill Critics Reply; U.S. Watches," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 11, 1979; and "Gallup Poll Finds U.S. Public Evenly Split on Arms Treaty," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 29, 1979.

[31]See Robert C. Aldrich, "The Pentagon Is Gaining," *The Nation*, January 19, 1980.

[32]The Committee on the Present Danger, *The 1980 Crisis (and What We Should Do about it)*, Washington, D.C.: January 1980, p. 2.

[33]Morton Kondracke, "Politics: The Neoconservative Dilemma," *The New Republic*, August 2-9, 1980, p. 11.

[34]For an elaboration on this theme see the insightful analysis by Thomas Weisskopf, "The Current Economic Analysis in Historical Perspective," *Socialist Review*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May-June 1981).

[35]"Their Mission Is to Keep Strength on the Barricades," *Boston Globe*, April 28, 1981, p. 1.

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[37]Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November 1979, p. 5.

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[39]Kirkpatrick, (Note 37), p. 41.

[40]Norman Podhoretz, "The Present Danger," *Commentary*, March 1980, p. 31.

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[100]Reagan's original 5% pledge in 1980 was based on a $158 billion budget for fiscal year 1981. By

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